



# Mid-Term Review

Rainforest Foundation Norway

Assessing 'Rights-based REDD+:  
Indigenous peoples as guardians  
of the rainforest'

16.11.2018

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# Acknowledgement

This Mid-Term Review (MTR) was prepared by KPMG International Development Advisory Services (IDAS) Norway for Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN).

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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Rainforest Foundation Norway.

# Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>AMAN</b>	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara</i>
<b>BLU</b>	<i>Badan Layanan Umum / General service Unit</i>
<b>BNDES</b>	<i>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social / The National Economic and Social Development Bank</i>
<b>BRL</b>	Brazilian real
<b>CBFM</b>	Community Based Forest Management
<b>CGGAM</b>	<i>Coordenação Geral de Gestão Ambiental da FUNAI / General Environmental Management Coordination of FUNAI</i>
<b>CLARA</b>	Climate, Land, Ambition, and Rights Alliance
<b>COFA</b>	<i>Comitê Orientador do Fundo Amazônia / the Amazon Fund Guidance Committee</i>
<b>COP</b>	Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change
<b>FCPF</b>	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
<b>FPIC</b>	Free, prior and Informed Consent
<b>FUNAI</b>	<i>Fundação Nacional do Índio / National Indian Foundation</i>
<b>GCF</b>	Green Climate Fund
<b>GTCRR</b>	<i>Groupe de Travail Climat REDD Rénové / Renovated REDD Climate Working Group</i>
<b>HR</b>	Human Resource
<b>IDAS</b>	International Development Advisory Services
<b>IEPÉ</b>	<i>Instituto de Pesquisa e Formação Indígena / Institute of Indigenous Research and Education</i>
<b>IFC</b>	International Finance Corporation
<b>IPAM</b>	<i>Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazonia / Amazon Environmental research Institute</i>
<b>ISA</b>	<i>Instituto Socioambiental / Socio-Environmental Institute</i>
<b>KKI Warsi</b>	<i>Kelompok Konservasi Indonesia – Warsi / Indonesian conservation community</i>
<b>LPIC</b>	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples' Platform
<b>MFA</b>	(Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MRV</b>	Measuring, Reporting and Verification of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from forests
<b>MTR</b>	Mid-Term Review
<b>NDC</b>	National Determined Contribution
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-governmental organisations
<b>NICFI</b>	Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative
<b>NNV</b>	<i>Norges Naturvernforbund / Friends of the Earth Norway</i>
<b>NOK</b>	Norwegian Krone
<b>Norad</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

<b>NTFP-EP</b>	Non-Timber Forest Products - Exchange Programme
<b>PNGATI</b>	<i>Política Nacional de Gestão Territorial e Ambiental</i> / National Policy for the environmental and territorial management of Indigenous Territories
<b>PNMC</b>	<i>Plano Nacional Sobre Mudança do Clima</i> / National Policy on Climate Change
<b>PSC-RJ</b>	<i>Partido Social Cristão – Rio de Janeiro</i> / The Social Christian Party – Rio de Janeiro
<b>RCA</b>	<i>Rede de Cooperação Amazônica</i> / Amazon Cooperation Network
<b>REDD+</b>	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
<b>REM</b>	REDD Early Mover
<b>RFN</b>	Rainforest Foundation Norway
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework for Climate Change Convention

# Executive Summary

**This is the external Mid-Term Review (MTR)** of the Rainforest Foundation Norway's five-year programme: "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the rainforest". It is funded by Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) through Norad. The programme started in 2016 and ends after 2020, and is implemented by RFN in partnership with 18 partner organisations in six different countries: Indonesia, Brazil, Peru, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Myanmar, Colombia as well as a global component focusing on influencing governments in the international climate change negotiations.

**The purpose of the MTR is twofold:** 1) Assess the overall progress towards the achievement of the programme outcomes as specified in the Programme Document, and 2) Learn and improve the ongoing work for the remaining period of the programme. This review is a consolidated review of the entire programme, however, particular emphasis is on Indonesia and Brazil where field visits were conducted.

**The programme focuses on capacity building and targeted advocacy interventions in order to influence the national and global design of REDD+ and multilateral programmes.** The interventions are meant to ensure good governance and to influence the design of safeguards that protect biodiversity and the rights of indigenous peoples in the United Nations Framework for Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) negotiations. This entails developing guidelines for Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), advocating land rights and help access climate-related funding opportunities for indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, as well as build a strong global civil society alliance towards UNFCCC and global funds such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

**The total budget for all five years is up to NOK 150.1 million**, with an annual budget of approximately NOK 31 million. This includes an additional grant received for the Colombia program in 2016, as well as full inclusion of the Colombia program in 2017-2020. Total spend up till 20<sup>th</sup> August is NOK 58,702 million, 48% of the total budget. In addition, RFN recently received an additional grant of NOK 48.88 million from Norad, and many partners have some level of co-funding from other sources at country level. NOK 11.23 million remained unspent at the end of 2017, largely due to three cases of mismanagement (two in Indonesia and one in DRC) that have caused suspension of activities and less needs than anticipated in the early phase. With the gradual need for funding throughout the programme cycle, some level of underspending in the first years is to be expected.

## 1.1 Key Findings

The programme is rated satisfactory (4.8 out of 6).

*The programme scores the highest on relevance and efficiency, and has positive impact on beneficiaries. But financial sustainability is a challenge, and the results framework does not sufficiently reflect realities on the ground.*

**The program as a whole is largely on-track at output level, but struggles to attain its objectives on outcome level.**

Despite a comprehensive results framework and indicators, the link between outputs and outcomes is not clear, and there is a "missing middle" in terms of the direct outcomes achieved at country level.

**Sustainability:** The primary challenge to sustainability is the financial dependency on RFN. Long-term partnerships




Figure 1: Consolidated Programme Rating

create financial dependency, and may not be sustainable in the long run. However, the potential outcomes of the programme – if successful – could contribute to increased sustainability.

**Relevance:** The program concept is to a large extent well designed and realistic. Programme activities are highly relevant to local partner NGOs, and indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities clearly benefit from the project.

**Efficiency:** RFN scores high on efficiency, and has a clear added value to the partner. RFN's experience-sharing, supervision, flexibility and openness are valued as an approach that empowers partners and wider stakeholders. Expenditures are in line with budget, with some adjustments.

**Impact:** The impact is likely beyond what is captured by the results framework and the outcomes utilised. The programme has to a large extent been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action, and has responded adequately to unexpected negative side-effects such as changing political circumstances and mismanagement.

## 1.2 Key Lessons learned

- ✓ **RFN is on-track with most outputs, whereas outcomes are largely behind targets.** There are a number of additional factors determining progress at this level, and it is quite obvious that there is a "missing middle" in the results chain in which outcomes that can directly be attributed to the outputs could have been highlighted. The results framework was edited with effect from 2018, specified in the document "Baseline and expected results *Klimaprogrammet*". The revision narrows the gap between Outputs and Outcomes to some extent, but still leaves a gap. Despite the fact that the overall outcomes are not directly irrelevant, it is not necessarily a direct link between progress on outputs and progress on outcome level. Many achievements are included in the narrative reporting, but not according to predefined targets and indicators that can be measured, compared and aggregated over time.
- ✓ **The programme has had a positive impact on gender equity and empowering female indigenous representatives.** This has had an important impact on participation of women in REDD+ discussions, but it has also had a likely impact in terms of gender equity within local communities. This outcome is not properly reflected in RFN's results reporting.
- ✓ **RFN's activities are highly relevant, and has in all likelihood had great impact on the REDD+ agenda both internationally and in many forest countries.** RFN maintains a good balance between professional NGOs and "less professional" indigenous associations, which ensures both professionalism and legitimacy. An important contribution of the programme is to enable indigenous representation at UNFCCC forums and other international REDD+ forums.
- ✓ **The result hierarchy is to a lesser degree logical and coherent, and the link between outputs and outcomes is considered weak.** This could potentially affect quality and impact of the program, as outputs/outcomes do not entirely reflect the full realities on the ground. It could also potentially impede on RFN's ability to adjust program priorities, despite the fact that RFN has a very close follow-up and dialogue with partners and strong country expertise among its programme staff. There is also a gap between outcome and impact, and to what extent the programme is accountable for impact and likelihood of impact, is not addressed. RFN writes in the Results Framework Document that RFN can only be held accountable for outputs, not outcomes.
- ✓ **The indicators are largely quantitative, and do to a lesser degree reflect the qualitative aspects of results achieved.** Some of the outputs are also easily confused with the activity undertaken, in particular output 1.3 (media attention). RFN is already reporting on qualitative data in its narrative reporting and partially through its Policy Framework Tool and Cancun Safeguards Tool. However, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) on qualitative aspects could better reflect actual progress towards outputs/outcomes. As an example, capacity building is merely measured in terms of no. of people and no. of workshops. This is not sufficient to assess whether the participants have acquired "the necessary competence and capacity to effectively promote improved forest governance" (output 2.4).
- ✓ **Surpassing of targets on some of the indicators suggest that initial targets are set too low.** For several outputs, such as training events, the targets were set too low initially but have been increased in the 2018 annual plan.
- ✓ **The Norad pre-defined indicators (levels) is a measurement of quantity of policy,** but lacks a proper measurement of the quality of the policy. In the case of Indonesia, the targeted policies are almost completed, but most of them are insufficient in terms of covering REDD+ principles. Policies are highly "carbon oriented", whereas indigenous rights is often absent (despite noteworthy achievements

by RFN and partners). RFN should consider if there is a need to develop additional (qualitative) indicators.

- ✓ **The policies that RFN is monitoring are the same policies that are used to measure baseline and targets under RFN's global programme** (funded by Norad's civil society allocation). To avoid overlap, RFN makes a division between what RFN have achieved directly (reported under NICFI funding) and what partners have achieved directly (reported underneath the global programme). However, it is challenging to separate between the two, although RFN has a clear intention to do so as specified in the Baseline document.
- ✓ **Media attention and public awareness is an important factor in all programme countries**, and it seems odd that output 1.1 is only covering Norway.
- ✓ **RFN gets credit from local partners in terms of the partnership model and approach.** RFN brings an important added value to the partners, not only in terms of funding, but also in terms of joint policy initiatives (in particular on the global level), empowerment/capacity building, gender sensitivity and an overall flexible approach with high relevance to the local context. RFN is by several partners regarded as different from other "typical" donors, in a positive sense. The activities are regarded as relevant not only among professional NGOs and government officials, but also among indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities (final-end beneficiaries).
- ✓ **One of the main reasons why the programme performs satisfactory is due to long-term partnerships.** The influence RFN and partners have had on policy development nationally and internationally, would not have been possible without the standing, competence and network the local partners have established over a longer period of time. This allows the programme to be effective and cost-efficient, although there is an inherent risk of unsustainable dependency.
- ✓ **Many partners are highly dependent of RFN's contribution, and several struggle with weak management.** RFN has contributed to strengthening this, and one of the local partners (AMAN) have even been able to achieve funding directly from Norad as a consequence. However, in general, many are highly dependent on RFN funding and it is probable that programme activities would be discontinued if RFN withdraws. It is also likely that some partners would struggle to survive without RFN funding.
- ✓ **The fact that RFN has uncovered three cases of fraud/mismanagement, is an indication of good management systems.** RFN has a very close follow-up and dialogue with partners, something that could mitigate the risk of making the wrong assumptions about priorities within the program. However, it could also mean that RFN did not undertake proper due diligence before entering into partnership with the institution in the first place. RFN has tools for performing partner assessments, however, these have not been assessed as part of this review.
- ✓ **Some of the programme countries could benefit from strengthened country level presence.** In DRC, the challenge of weak management has been severe. RFN opened a country office in 2018, something that may mitigate the risk of weak local NGO financial/management capacity.
- ✓ **There was a noteworthy level of underspending the first years of the programme**, due to three cases of mismanagement, and generally lower needs than anticipated in the first phase of the programme. The latter is to be expected, but it is important to cater for similar level of overspending in the second half of the programme period.
- ✓ **Outcome 2 is so far the largest spend of the program (42%) of the total spend in the period of 2016-2017** where the activities are happening at the national and grassroots level. The outputs with largest spend are related to capacity building within forest governance and policies for indigenous peoples' rights. There is no indication that the use of funds at project level was inefficient, but there may be a need for reconciliation of figures pertaining to the Brazil programme.

## 1.3 Recommendations

1. **RFN should consider formulating an explicit Theory of Change, in addition to the results framework.** Clarity on intended results, at what level, contribution/attribution and accountability may bring better clarity to how the results framework and M&E system could be improved. This could potentially also help simplify reporting which becomes increasingly complex when utilising four different formats: narrative report, logical framework, Policy Framework tool and Cancun Safeguards Tool. Several minor inconsistencies in reporting were found during the review, and there seems to be potential for simplifying reporting formats.
2. **RFN should consider introducing intermediate outcomes.** Strengthening achievements towards the outcomes is not so much a question about changing approaches and/or activities, but more about

revising the results framework to better reflect results (and relevance) at country level. It would also enable RFN to better highlight and communicate potential additional outcomes of the programme. This could for instance be in the form of outcomes for gender equity, capacity building on community level (multiplication effect) or outcomes on adding value to the institutions or people whom RFN partners are trying to influence at country level (i.e. parliaments, governments, law enforcement units, corruption watch, judiciary, etc.). This is important not only to improve reporting and make achievements more visible, but also to be fully compliant with Norad's grant scheme rules which clearly states that annual reports shall report on "outcome effects achieved for target groups."

3. **RFN should consider substitute and/or introduce some new indicators**, as most of them only capture quantitative data and do not encompass the qualitative aspects. Some may also be irrelevant, such as no. of press briefings (indicator 1.3.2). This means that they are not sufficient to fully reflect whether progress towards the defined outputs/outcomes is sufficient.
4. **RFN should consider introducing simple measures to assess quality of the training**, such as measuring:
  - a. *The training process*: measuring approach and management of training (prior and after training)
  - b. *Learner performance*: measuring level of learner performance (prior and after training)
  - c. *Participant satisfaction*: measuring participant satisfaction (prior and after training)

There are a number of existing available models for evaluating training, and it does not have to be made very complicated. In the case of Brazil, the indicator target is defined as: "At least 40 leaders have completed a course on REDD+, climate change and/or other relevant issues per the set curriculum and are better able to act as protagonists in the public debate on national and international level." The question is how this result is substantiated, when there is only an indicator measuring no. of participants.

5. **RFN should consider if partner reporting from the two Norad-funded programmes could be further harmonized**, thereby simplifying management and administration for partners participating in both programs. This is already being done in Brazil, where partners have one agreement with RFN and submit consolidated plans, budgets and reports for both programs. However, for other country programs, RFN operates with separate agreements and reporting requirements. Adding to this, not all partners are included in both programs.
6. **RFN should consider if there is a need for a consolidated communication strategy with partners**, and to include the other partners' achievement under output 1.1. Indicators on this output should not only cover number of press briefings produced, but also no. of media coverage, what kind of media, etc.
7. **RFN should verify that proper due diligence of partners is undertaken**, to avoid potential mismanagement. If the existing procedures are not deemed sufficient, RFN should consider review its procedures and compliance systems.
8. **RFN should also carefully consider if there is a need to ensure a local presence in certain countries**, in particular to have a close follow-up of financial management. This does not necessarily be in the form of a RFN country office, but could be achieved through outsourcing services to a semi-independent management/control unit and/or M&E unit. DRC is one such example where RFN has a presence, but also partners in Indonesia would benefit from this.
9. **There could be potential for closer collaboration regarding training of indigenous peoples**. In Indonesia, there is potential for scaling-up for wider impact and outreach of RFN partners: expansion in other areas similar to those in areas where RFN partners have been successful, and to support provincial government through training and improved coordination.
10. **More exchanges between programme countries could strengthen learning within the programme**. Strong countries like Brazil could potentially do more in terms of training and inspiration to weaker countries, such as DRC or Myanmar. The existing partner meetings are much appreciated, and it is considered useful to learn from countries like Brazil that is more advanced in REDD+ than the other countries.
11. **RFN needs to make sure that there is sufficient absorption capacity within the programme** and that underspending in early phase of the programme is balanced towards the end of the programme.
12. **RFN should verify whether there is a need for reconciliation of some of the figures, in order to maintain good budget control**. The review has not undertaken a comprehensive review of budgets and financial reports, but would recommend that RFN assesses the figures encountered for the Brazil programme. Budget utilisation in local currency (BRL) was 100% in both 2016 and 2017, whereas the Norwegian budget only shows that 76% utilisation in 2017 (in NOK).

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose and objectives

**This is the external Mid-Term Review (MTR)** of the Rainforest Foundation Norway's five-year programme: "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the rainforest". The MTR covers the period from 2016 to the present. The programme is funded by Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). The programme started in 2016 and ends after 2020, and is implemented by RFN in partnership with 18 partners in seven different countries. Expected outcomes are:

- ✓ The international climate regime for land-use and forests includes a rights-based approach and provisions to protect natural ecosystems.
- ✓ Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities enjoy greater respect for their land rights and are recognized for their sustainable management and protection of the rainforest.

**The purpose of the MTR is twofold:**

1. Assess the overall progress towards the achievement of the programme outcomes as specified in the Programme Document, and
2. Learn and improve the ongoing work for the remaining period of the programme.

**The consolidated budget for all five years is up to NOK 122.5 million**, with an annual budget of approximately NOK 25 million. Adding to this, RFN has received an additional grant of NOK 48.88 million for three additional projects (2018-2020) underneath the current programme agreement. Although the programme is funded entirely by Norad/NICFI, many of the partners have co-funding from other sources at the country level. Activities are to a large extent harmonized and integrated within normal operations of the local partners, as well as regular funding from Norad over the civil society allocation.

The Programme is implemented by RFN and partners in six different countries, as well as a global component:

- ✓ **Indonesia:** Warsi, Perempuan AMAN, Madani.<sup>1</sup>
- ✓ **Brazil:** ISA (*Instituto Socioambiental*), RCA (*Rede de Cooperação Amazônica*).
- ✓ **Peru:** AIDSESP, FENAMAD, ORPIO, CORPI-SL, DAR.
- ✓ **DRC:** GTCR-R, CFLEDD.
- ✓ **Myanmar:** CAT
- ✓ **Colombia:** GAIA, OPIAC, ONIC, AAS and Tierra Digna
- ✓ **Global:** Naturvernforbundet.

**Main target groups of the programme are:**

- ✓ Indigenous peoples and civil society organisations
- ✓ National and local governments, incl. national REDD+ agencies
- ✓ Country-specific finance mechanisms, such as the Amazon Fund in Brazil and similar arrangements in other countries
- ✓ UNFCCC and multilateral finance instruments for REDD+, such as the World Bank's FCPF, the BioCarbon Fund, and the Green Climate Fund
- ✓ Key REDD+ donor countries

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<sup>1</sup> Note that contracts with two partners, Walhi Kalteng and Paradisea, were cancelled due to mismanagement.

## 2. Context and background

**Rainforest Foundation Norway was founded in 1989** as the Norwegian branch of the International Rainforest Foundation network, established by Sting and his wife Trudie Styler to assist the indigenous Kayapo people of Brazil. In 1996, RFN became an independent foundation. As of today, RFN has a staff consisting of 57 full-time employees, and manages an annual budget of approximately NOK 174 million (2017). Approximately 58% of the funding is provided by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

### **RFN focuses on three areas of work:**

1. Support the development of sustainable communities: strengthening the capacity of forest-dependent communities to define and realise their development needs within the framework of rights-based sustainable rainforest management.
2. Promote political and legal framework conditions which ensure protection of the rainforest and the human rights of forest peoples: influencing public policies, land-use planning, laws and regulations affecting rainforest management and the human rights of indigenous peoples and forest-based communities.
3. Halt direct threats to the rainforest and to the rights of indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities: eliminating direct causes of deforestation, forest degradation and violations of the human rights of forest peoples, related to private- or public-sector commercial activities.<sup>2</sup>

RFN started out by working with partners in Brazil, many of which are still key strategic partners of RFN. However, RFN has gradually expanded its operations to other forest countries, and is today managing projects in a total of seven countries: Brazil, Peru, DR Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Colombia and Myanmar. RFN has a policy of mainly working through local partners, and has today approximately some 60 partner NGOs in the recipient countries. RFN has one country office in DRC, opened in 2018. RFN has also taken on a visible role within policy advocacy, not the least pertaining to campaigning against the use of palm oil, as well as taking a prominent role among civil society at the annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) and similar REDD+ related forums.

**Many civil society actors actively prepared and advocated for the concept of REDD+ before it was acknowledged** and fully integrated as a part of the climate negotiations. RFN and *Norges Naturvernforbund* was also a part of this advocacy effort, and proposed early on that Norway should establish a Climate and Forest Initiative. This correlated well with the priorities of the Norwegian government at the time. Thus, at the climate change negotiations (COP) in Bali in 2007, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg made a pledge of up to three billion Norwegian Kroner per year to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries. The rationale behind this support was to make a substantial contribution in the struggle against global warming, while simultaneously also contribute to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. This has fuelled the international debate and focus on REDD+. As land use change and forest loss accounts for some 12-29% of global greenhouse gas emissions<sup>3</sup>, the inclusion of reducing emissions from land use change was considered essential to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC. The concept was soon adopted by governments to form a key part of the international climate change negotiations through the annual COPs. In 2015 the UNFCCC rulebook on REDD+ was completed, and countries were encouraged to implement and support REDD+ (article 5 of the Paris Agreement).

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<sup>2</sup> RFN's Strategy 2018-2030: [https://d5i6is0eze552.cloudfront.net/documents/Styringsdokumenter/RF\\_strategy\\_2018-2030\\_web.pdf?mtime=201809111100928](https://d5i6is0eze552.cloudfront.net/documents/Styringsdokumenter/RF_strategy_2018-2030_web.pdf?mtime=201809111100928)

<sup>3</sup> Werf, Morton, DeFries, Olivier, Kasibhatla, Jackson, Collatz and Randerson (2009): *CO2 emissions from forest loss*. Nature Geoscience. 2 (11): 737–738. [doi:10.1038/ngeo671](https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo671)

In 2008, the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) was officially launched. NICFI’s secretariat within the Ministry of the Environment has the overall responsibility, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and embassies abroad, as well as the Norwegian Agency for Development (Norad), are responsible for NICFI related development policy, dialogue with partners, follow-up, technical input, management and disbursement of funds, etc. Norad is among other things, managing a grant scheme for NICFI funding to civil society<sup>4</sup>, of which the current programme receives support. NICFI funding shall be used in accordance with the objectives of NICFI, and contribute to one or several of the following objectives:

- ✓ Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) included in a new international climate regime.
- ✓ Cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.
- ✓ Natural forests are conserved to maintain their carbon storage capacity.

**NICFI seeks to influence the policy process globally and in key forest countries through strategic partnerships in order to prove that real action on a national level is possible.** It shall also encourage large scale emission reductions in accordance with commitments made in the Paris Agreement, as well as contributing to the design and establishment of an integrated architecture of multilateral REDD initiatives. Contributing to the establishment of a global, binding and long term regime for reduced greenhouse gas emissions is an overarching objective of Norwegian climate policy. Climate policies and development policies shall be mutually enhancing.

The role of civil society in this context is to 1) contribute to policy development and consensus building, 2) promote rights and sustainable economic development through awareness raising, sharing of knowledge and skills, and 3) testing and implementing of green livelihood models. Civil society should, according to the Grant Scheme rules: "(...) promote and hold governments and private actors accountable for good forest management and sustainable development policies. Civil society may also take direct part in promoting and protecting human rights, especially of indigenous people and other forest dependent populations."<sup>5</sup>

**Since the launch of NICFI, RFN has grown steadily in terms of size and funding.** This is due to the obvious strategic fit with NICFI, and a general recognition of RFN as a professional programme manager with high relevance for NICFI's objectives. The current climate programme is no exception to this, and funding was awarded by Norad based on an open call in 2016. The call identified specific outcomes established by NICFI, in which all applicants had to adhere to.

RFN chose to identify two main outcomes for the programme:

<b>Norad/NICFI outcome 1:</b> <i>Incentives to achieve REDD+ efforts are established through the new international climate regime/or other climate, environment and development funding streams</i>
<b>RFN programme-specific outcome 1:</b> <i>The international climate regime for land-use and forests includes a rights-based approach and provisions to protect natural ecosystems</i>
<b>Norad/NICFI’s outcome 2:</b> <i>Governments in targeted developing countries have implemented REDD+ related policies, measures and safeguards, such as policies for green growth, sustainable livelihoods, land use-planning the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and women’s rights</i>
<b>RFN programme-specific outcome 2:</b> <i>Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities enjoy greater respect for their land rights and are recognized for their sustainable management and protection of the rainforest.</i>


<sup>4</sup> See: <https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/regelverk-for-norads-tilskuddsordninger/rules-for-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society-english.pdf>

## 2.1 Theory of Change

RFN and partners use the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) as a tool for project planning, implementation and reporting. However, the programme's Theory of Change (ToC) is not formulated explicitly in the programme document apart from the results framework. For this reason, the review team has attempted to construct a ToC in order to make findings clearer. The ToC can be summarised to the following:

Figure 2: The review team's simplified understanding of RFN's Theory of Change



**The programme focuses on empowerment and capacity building of local communities,** as well as targeted advocacy interventions in order to influence the national and global design of REDD+. This is, obviously, immensely complex. REDD+ is in itself a highly complex theme, and it is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the many different perspectives and approaches towards REDD+ and the inherent risks. Sufficient to say, the targeted programme interventions of RFN and partners are meant to ensure good governance and indigenous peoples' rights within the national and global policy making of REDD+ (output/outcome). This is again supposed to ensure a successful architecture of REDD+ both nationally and internationally (outcome). And finally, at the highest impact level, this is intended to have a positive impact on preservation of rainforests, biodiversity and the people living in those forests.

**RFN's strategy is to influence national REDD+ planning processes, multilateral programmes and the international REDD+ framework.** A part of this advocacy work has been to contribute in the design of safeguards that protect biodiversity and the rights of indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC negotiations. Among other things, RFN claim to have had a central role in developing guidelines for FPIC in the UN-REDD Programme, a Constitutional Court decision granting indigenous peoples' right to customary lands in Indonesia, the development of a draft REDD+ strategy for DRC that includes indigenous peoples' participation and the creation of the Amazon Fund in Brazil – as well as procedures of the Fund to cater for indigenous populations' involvement.

**The issue of contribution/attribution becomes increasingly challenging to handle the higher one gets in the results framework.** Even at output level, there are some of the outputs that RFN can hardly be held accountable for (marked in green), whereas others are a more direct result from RFN's activities (marked in red). The two outcomes may be influenced to some extent by RFN's interventions, however, it is beyond RFN to ensure that these outcomes are achieved. This depends on a number of factors, a challenging political process at national and global stage, and, lastly, it is the responsibility of national governments to outline and implement these policies.

RFN writes in the baseline document that outcomes represent the most important goals, but these are beyond RFN's accountability ceiling. They are merely a statement to RFN's strategic priorities. Outputs are, on the other hand, something RFN consider to be within the accountability ceiling of RFN (and partners). Still, the review team have chosen to mark two outputs in green, despite the fact that the outputs (output 2.2 and 2.3, respectively) are merely focusing on advocacy efforts. However, the intention is clearly to influence the government to acknowledge land claims, as well as to implement the Cancun safeguards. Hence, it could be argued that there is a "missing middle" between output and outcome level.

**As such, measuring "success" or "level of achievement" of this programme is not easily done,** and may be subject to different opinions. This report is an attempt to at least substantiate some of the achievements made. However, a key question for this review is whether the goal hierarchy is sufficient to reflect realities on the ground, e.g. to what extent it truly reflects actual outcomes of programme activities. This will be further elaborated later in the report.

# 3. Methodology for data collection

## 3.1 Approach

To review the Programme, the OECD-DAC criteria<sup>6</sup> were used as the basis to organize the findings as stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the call, including the review questions from the ToR:

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1. **Effectiveness - the extent to which the completed project has attained its objectives**

*Review question 1: To what extent is RFN and partners implementation on track to achieving the programme's outcomes (effectiveness)?*

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2. **Sustainability - the probability of continued long-term benefit**

*Review question 2: Should RFN and partners do anything differently in the remainder of the programme period, to strengthen achievements towards the outcomes? Are there any gaps that we should address in order to achieve outcome targets?*

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3. **Relevance - the extent to which the completed project met the needs of the recipient partner and beneficiaries**

*Review question 3: Is there reason to re-consider the planned outcomes and outputs (relevance)?*

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4. **Efficiency - the extent to which inputs were translated into outputs**

*Review question 4: What is RFN's added value to the partner (added value)? Should we do anything differently in order to strengthen the added value towards our partners?*

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5. **Impact - the (likelihood) extent to which the project produced positive and negative changes, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended**

*Review questions 5-6: Has the programme been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action? What are the key lessons learned so far in the programme implementation?*

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<sup>6</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

**The Review was carried out in three phases:** preparation (output: inception report), field visits and interviews (output: data and preliminary analysis), reporting (output: data analysis, report and presentation).

Table 1: Activity plan of the review

		August		September			October				
Plan \ Week		35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
Phase 1	<b>Planning</b> • Start up meeting with Rainforest Foundation • Initial literature review • Plan field visit • Prepare inception report, including detailed work plan, interview guides etc	Planning									
	<b>Field visit/ data collection</b> • Interviews in Norway • Fieldwork to Brazil (29.-27. September) and Indonesia (24. September – 5th october) • Conduct semi-structured interviews with local partners and beneficiaries. • Focus group interviews.				Field visits						
Phase 3	<b>Analysis and reporting</b> • Integrated analysis and recommendations • Draft report • Presentation of draft report to RFN and partners • Final report						Analysis reporting				
	<b>Deadlines/deliverables</b>		Start-up meeting		Inception Report Sept 14			Draft Report: Oct 15		Final report: Oct. 30	

### 3.2 Methodology

**Data collection instruments.** The Review Team primarily gathered data from:

1. **Project documents:** agreements, inception report, annual reports, progress reports, financial reports, project visit reports and relevant project outputs.
2. **Data:** reports on policy implementation as well as land rights/demarcation of hectares for forest dependent communities and indigenous peoples. Literature review of relevant studies.
3. **Meetings and interviews of stakeholders and beneficiaries:** fieldwork to Brazil and Indonesia were conducted. A total of 73 persons were interviewed. Interviewees consisted of the following categories:
  - a. RFN (Norway)
  - b. Partner organisations (Brazil and Indonesia) and *Norges Naturvernforbund* (Norway)
  - c. Government agencies (Brazil and Indonesia)
  - d. Independent expert organisations (Brazil and Indonesia)
  - e. The Norwegian Government (Embassy in Brasilia and Jakarta)
  - f. Beneficiaries: representatives of indigenous populations and forest dependent communities (Brazil and Indonesia)

**Review matrix.** A review matrix was developed based on the ToR and the OECD DAC criteria. The review matrix has been the fundamental analytical tool for systemising and assessing data, and to provide a qualified opinion of progress (see chapter 5, Overall Programme Rating). Interview guides were designed accordingly.

**Rating scale.** To make the Review more reader friendly and facilitate comparison of reviews, a rating scale (1-6) was used to rate the Programme on each of the Review criteria (see table below). Based on triangulation of data, scoring was given in order to indicate level of goal achievement and progress made on country level, as well as on aggregated level. It should be noted that this is a quantification of highly qualitative data, and is merely an attempt to substantiate results as well as to permit aggregation and comparison between very different country contexts.

Table 2: Programme rating scale

Grade	Description	Score
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	No shortcomings/ Achieved 90% or exceeded targets	6
<b>Satisfactory</b>	Minor shortcomings/ Achieved over 70% of targets	5
<b>Moderately satisfactory</b>	Moderate shortcomings/ Achieved 50% of targets	4
<b>Moderately unsatisfactory</b>	Significant shortcomings/ Achieved less than 25% of targets	3
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	Major shortcomings/ Not achieved targets	2
<b>Highly unsatisfactory</b>	Severe shortcomings/ Not achieved targets and caused negative impacts	1

### 3.3 Limitation

**This is not an evaluation** but a mid-term review to verify whether the programme is on track with its implementation according to plan i.e. assess and describe the results of the programme so far and provide concrete recommendations for the remaining programme period. The Review relies on existing documentation such as project documents, earlier reviews, annual report and interviews with Programme stakeholders and beneficiaries. No additional research was performed by the Review team given the limited timeframe and resources for the assignment.

**The Review covers the entire programme, but gives particular attention to Brazil and Indonesia,** which were subject to field visits (see annex 1 and 2 for country reports from field visits). This report does not therefore present an in-depth assessment of all aspects of the entire programme, however, the analysis is based on contrasting these two country cases in order to make an overall assessment of the consolidated programme. Field visits also rely on the perspective of one reviewer, although conclusions and general assessments have been calibrated.

# 4. Review of progress towards programme outcomes

The results framework of the programme utilises standardised outcomes and indicators, as defined by NICFI/Norad. In this chapter, the review assesses the different outcomes, outputs and indicators utilised to monitor progress against set targets. A traffic light system is utilised to indicate to what extent RFN and partners are on track to achieving the individual outputs and outcomes:

Satisfactory	Performing on target, or exceeding targets set.
Moderately satisfactory	Minor shortcomings, achieved above 50% of targets.
Unsatisfactory	Achieved less than 50% of targets.

## 4.1 Progress on outcome 1

*The international climate regime for land-use and forests includes a rights-based approach and provisions to protect natural ecosystems*

Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
Level 2	Level 4 (level 5 for indicator 1.2)	Not defined	-	Indicator 1.2/1.4: GCF has interim safeguards based on IFC standards

**There is no defined annual target for outcome 1**, merely an intended vision to reach level 4 during the programme period (*The targeted government develops a REDD+ related policy/measure. This stage may include policy-planning, timelines, participation of stakeholder groups etc.*). There are two specific policies that defines baseline and target for this outcome: 1) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 2) the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

**There is hardly any progress reported.** In the narrative report for 2016, RFN reports that there is no progress, due to the fact that the framework for the Paris agreement is still in early stages, with no documents finalized. Little progress was also reported in 2017, as the development of the framework for the implementation of the Paris agreement was still ongoing. In RFN's reporting, it is stated that "lack of progress and limited remaining negotiation time reduces the likelihood of achieving provisions to protect indigenous peoples' rights and natural ecosystems in the UNFCCC post-2020 framework."

**A positive result was that GCF included a provision for rights and measures relevant for indigenous peoples**, something that could entail an improvement in terms of protection of rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities. It was also agreed during the UNFCCC negotiations to establish Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples' Platform (LCIP Platform), which is relevant for progress on indicator 1.1 regarding inclusion of indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC post-2020 framework (albeit, not mentioned in the results framework report). Such achievement could potentially be reported as "intermediary outcomes", to better reflect progress towards the high-end outcome.

The policies that RFN is monitoring are the same policies that are used to measure baseline and targets under RFN's global programme (funded by Norad's civil society allocation). To avoid overlap, RFN makes a division between what RFN have achieved directly (reported under NICFI funding) and what partners have directly achieved (reported underneath the global programme). However, it is challenging to separate between the two, although RFN has a clear intention to do so as specified in the Baseline document. It would be a benefit to the programme if further harmonisation would be possible. This is already being done in Brazil, where partners have one agreement with RFN and submit consolidated plans, budgets and reports for both programs. However, for other country programs, RFN operates with separate agreements and reporting requirements.

In 2018, RFN introduced a new Policy Framework Assessment (PFA) to verify progress on the indicators. The new tool was intended to provide an assessment of progress on relevant policies in the programme countries, thus providing an improved means of verification for the indicators. This is clearly an improvement of measuring progress on advocacy actions and monitoring of policies from 2016/2017. Still, RFN could also consider revising some of the outputs, as well as to define some additional outcomes that would better reflect results (and relevance) at country level.

The main challenge with this outcome is attribution, and how to measure RFN's impact on high level outcomes where RFN cannot be hold accountable. There is clearly a gap between output and outcome level. An additional challenge is that it not easy for partners to separate between results from on project to another. In Indonesia, there are a total of 15 partners (in addition to two that have been cancelled due to mismanagement). One partner, Warsi, receives funding from both Norad programs. RFN has attempted to make a division between results achieved by RFN directly (reported under NICFI funding), and results that partners have achieved (reported underneath the global programme). However, it is extremely challenging to separate between the two, in particular when additional funding and donors are involved. A further complicating factor is that many achievements are the result of continuous working over some 20+ years, as in the case of Brazil.

## 4.2 Progress on outputs under outcome 1

*Output 1.1: Policy inputs are provided to targeted decision makers in UNFCCC, GCF and other relevant forums in the international climate regime to reinforce binding measures that ensure the rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities and the protection of natural ecosystems*

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
1.1.1 # of advocacy meetings between NNV/RFN/partners and targeted decisions makers for REDD+ and land-use in the climate regime	0	150	30	37	40
1.1.2 # of policy briefings produced by NNV/RFN/partners for use by decision makers	0	15	3	6	7

The output is fully on track, and targets have been surpassed in both 2016 and 2017. This is however, only a quantitative indicator that does not capture the quality or impact of the briefings and outcomes of meetings, and should be treated as such. A general observation is that many of the indicators are quantitative, and do not reflect the qualitative aspects of results achieved (although this is reported in the narrative report).

Surpassing of targets could also suggest that initial targets are set too low. For several outputs, such as training events, the targets were set too low initially but have been increased in the 2018 annual plan.

**Output example:**  
 In 2016, RFN and NNV produced a policy briefing together with members of CLARA, on the potential for carbon removal and storage in land and forests, when applying a rights-based approach. The policy briefing was presented at RFN's side-event at COP22 for policy makers and media, as well as at a seminar in Oslo together with Cicero.

**Output 1.2:** A coalition within global civil society, including NNV/RFN and partners, has collaborated in influencing decision makers on REDD+ and land-use in the climate regime

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
1.2.1 An effective coalition of key civil society actors, working on REDD+ and land-use, has a unified policy document and influence decision makers according to a coherent strategy.	No	Yes	Not defined	CLARA grown, more active lobby network	CLARA had a number of joint initiatives, revision of strategy + policy docs.

**This output has been largely achieved as CLARA (Climate, Land, Ambition, and Rights Alliance) has grown considerably in 2017**, and represents a broad coalition of civil society organisations working toward common goals within the UNFCCC. The coalition has sent a number of joint submissions to the UNFCCC, and published policy briefings explaining the importance of good guidelines regarding these topics, and had joint meetings with negotiators from different countries. Considering the successful joint initiatives and coordinated positions of civil society members, achievement in 2017 is considered satisfactory. Partners from Brazil confirmed that CLARA is an effective platform that accommodates for inclusion of indigenous peoples' representatives and promotion of joint advocacy.

**Output example:**

In 2017, CLARA coordinated with a number of other organisations, specifically EDF, TNC and CI, to develop common positions on forests and land-use in the post-2020 framework. Through this work, RFN and FERN organized a side-event at COP23 on the potential for emissions reductions and removals through community-led forest restoration.

**Output 1.3:** NNV and RFN organize events and provide press briefings to increase public awareness and media attention in Norway about the important role of REDD+ and land-use in the climate regime.

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
1.3.1 # of press briefings produced by NNV/RFN about REDD+ and land-use in the climate regime for the Norwegian press.	0	10	2	3	2
1.3.2 # of seminars and oral press briefings organized by NNV/RFN about REDD+ and land use in the climate regime with participants from Norwegian NGOs, politicians and media	Seminars: 0 Press briefs: 0	Seminars: 5 Press briefs: 10	Seminars: 1 Press briefs: 2	Seminars: 2 Press briefs: 0	Seminars: 2 Press briefs: 0

**Progress on this output is largely on track, but is considered moderately satisfactory** in terms of indicator 1.3.2. According to RFN, this is largely due to a practical matter as there are too few Norwegian journalists that press briefings are worth the effort. As such, the indicator is clearly not relevant, and RFN should consider revising and/or substitute it. As for output 1.1, the indicators are quantitative and do not capture the quality or impact of public awareness created. The output itself could be considered revised, as it is easily confused with the activities undertaken. The main point here is the awareness and media attention created.

**Output example:**

In 2017, RFN and other Norwegian NGOs published a report on how Norway reports on climate finance to OECD-DAC and the UNFCCC. The report depicts how Norwegian level of climate finance has decreased, and was presented to parliamentarians and Norad.

**Media attention and public awareness is an important factor in all programme countries**, and it seems odd that this output is only covering Norway. It could be useful to have a consolidated communication strategy with partners, and to include the programme countries for this output. Media attention is important for all programme countries. In Indonesia, for example, working with the media has been important in order to push for a strong moratorium policy.

## 4.3 Progress on outcome 2

*Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities enjoy greater respect for their land rights and are recognized for their sustainable management and protection of the rainforest*

Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
Indonesia: level 4/5 DRC: level 2 Brazil: level 3 Peru: level 3 Myanmar: level 2 Colombia: level 3	Indonesia: level 6 DRC: level 6 Brazil: level 6 Peru: level 6 Myanmar: level 4 Colombia: level 5	Not defined	Indonesia: 4/5 DRC: 3 Brazil: 4 Peru: 4 Myanmar: 2	Indonesia: 4/5 <b>DRC: 2</b> Brazil: 4 Peru: 4 Myanmar: 2 Colombia: 3

**There was some level of progress on this outcome in 2016, in DRC, Brazil and Peru.** Note that Colombia was not included in the general programme before 2017 (apart from a pilot with Gaia in 2016). In Brazil, several important steps towards the implementation of REDD+ were initiated in 2016, including the establishment of a National REDD+ Committee (CONAREDD+), approval of the national REDD+ plan, and implementation of concrete mitigation measures such as publication of a database to monitor deforestation in private land at a large scale, and extension of the soy moratorium in the Amazon. The main reason why Peru improved the outcome score in 2016 was because the National Strategy on Forests and Climate Change (NSFCC) was agreed upon by the Peruvian government. However, no annual targets have been defined.

**DRC dropped on the ranking in 2017, which is the main reason why the outcome is marked as unsatisfactory.** Having said so, this is likely due to the fact that RFN formulated the new baseline document in 2017 (for use in 2018 and beyond), and scores for 2017 at country level could have been revised as a consequence. Adding to this, there were challenges in DRC pertaining mismanagement of funds by one of the key partners, the National REDD+ network, GTCRR (*Groupe de Travail Climat REDD Rénové*). GTCRR has also been considered by RFN to lack sufficient capacity to coordinate mapping activities and data gathering. Delay in DRC is more notable on output level, not the least pertaining to the lack of a strong REDD+ network to follow up on relevant national initiatives. The process of investigating and dialogue with Norad has demanded a lot of resources from RFN's side, and has affected implementation negatively.

**Still, there were a number of positive achievements also on the other country programmes,** such as a two-year extension of a moratorium on primary forest and peatland in Indonesia, announcement of a national plan for the Recovery of Native Vegetation in Brazil, progress in Peru on the REDD+ national plan, clear targets being set for the forestry sector in Myanmar, and a Comprehensive Strategy for Control of Deforestation and Forest Management being presented in Colombia by the government. To what extent RFN and partners can be held accountable for promoting these policies, is difficult to assess. Still, it is reasonable to assume that RFN and partners have been central in many of the policy processes taking place at both national and international level, and influencing decision making. This is substantiated by a number of interviewees in both Indonesia and Brazil.

**Reported progress on the defined indicators is not entirely corresponding with the overall assessment of progress,** something that indicates that despite a likely contribution to achieving the outcomes, RFN can only be held accountable for *attribution* to outcome achievement. In fact, several of the indicators, in particular relating to implementation of Cancun safeguards (2.2) and hectares of land allocated to indigenous peoples (2.3), are behind expected targets. This could indicate that the indicators are not entirely adequate in measuring progress, and there may be a need for additional indicators and/or substitute some of them. Note that some indicators have already been revised, such as the indicator 2.2. (*Implementation of Cancun safeguards*) and indicator 2.4 (*Level of recognition of indigenous peoples and other forest dependant peoples*). Also note that Norad's pre-defined levels policy is merely a quantification of policy, but does not measure the qualitative aspects of the policy such as to what extent they encompass indigenous peoples' rights. In the case of Indonesia, the targeted policies are almost completed, but most of them are insufficient in term of covering REDD+ principles. Policies are highly "carbon oriented", whereas indigenous rights is often absent (despite noteworthy achievements by RFN and partners).

## 4.4 Progress on outputs under outcome 2

*Output 2.1: RFN and partners have advised decision makers on how to secure indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' rights and control over their traditional lands, territories and resources in a way that benefits both women and men*

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.1.1 # of relevant inputs from RFN and partners into public policy-making processes in programme period.	Indonesia: 0 DRC: 0 Brazil: 0 Peru: 0 Myanmar: 0 Colombia: 0 Global: 0	Indonesia: 15 DRC: 10 Brazil: 10 Peru: 8 Myanmar: 10 Colombia: 12 Global: 20	Indonesia: 3 DRC: 2 Brazil: 2 Peru: 2 Myanmar: 2 Colombia: 3 Global: 4	Indonesia: 3 DRC: 4 Brazil: 4 Peru: 2 Myanmar: 0 Colombia: (no report) Global: 8	Indonesia: 2 DRC: 1 Brazil: 5 Peru: 2 Myanmar: 4 Colombia: 2 Global: 2

**Progress on this output is largely on track, although it is deemed moderately satisfactory in 2017** as several countries are behind annual targets (Indonesia, DRC, Colombia and Global). Having said so, it is only a quantitative indicator that does not capture the quality or impact of the advices made.

**RFN is also monitoring specific policies under indicator 2.1 through the Policy Framework Assessment tool**, utilising the Norad scale on Level of implementation of REDD+-related policies and measures. This tool captures more of the qualitative aspects of the policies, and provides a good overview of the different national policies that RFN and partners are monitoring and trying to influence. It is not always self-explanatory, however. As an example, from 2016 till 2017, the DRC Moratorium on logging concessions fell from level 4 to level 2. This was explained in the 2017 narrative report to Norad, but not in the results framework.

**There are a number of narrative descriptions in the reporting**, depicting how advocacy actions have influenced policy processes. One such example is from Brazil in which partners have participated in a number of advocacy actions targeted towards the government of President Temer. The impact and importance of these actions were substantiated by a number of interviewees during fieldwork, mostly considered "damage control" due to the many concessions made by President Temer to the ruralist bench in Congress to – allegedly – avoid impeachment.<sup>7</sup> However, it would be good to have a qualitative indicator for instance on gender equity specific policies and the quality of these (rated 1-6, for instance), and to what extent the input were put to use (through inclusion of concrete proposals into policies, or similar).

**Output example:**  
In 2016, RFN reported that the Congolese Minister of Environment attempted to lift the moratorium on logging concessions without meeting the legal requirements for doing so. RFN and partners considered this to have potentially severe negative consequences for the preservation of forests in DRC, and mobilised to advocate against the decision. The moratorium was maintained.

<sup>7</sup> See for instance: [https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/07/21/politica/1500589783\\_221019.html](https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/07/21/politica/1500589783_221019.html)

**Output 2.2: Indigenous peoples' and other forest-dependent communities' land claims have been documented**

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.2.1 Hectares of lands and territories documented and claimed	Indonesia: 0.336 Mha	Indonesia: 0.5 Mha	2016/2017: initiation of mapping 2018: 200.000 ha 2019: 200.000 ha	Mapping initiated	Mapping initiated Legal recognition Peru
2.2.2 # of local, gender-sensitive land tenure processes in DRC documented	0	4 cases	Not defined	Not done	Not done

**Progress on this output is behind target, and the two indicators have moderate and unsatisfactorily performance in both 2016 and 2017.** The main reason for this is due to the fact that progress have been somewhat slower than expected in Indonesia. In DRC, progress is delayed but now moving through RFN's new partnership with CFLEDD. Peru was previously reporting on this indicator, but will from 2018 not be included as RFN considered legal recognition and documentation of claims to be more relevant under policy monitoring.

**Indicator 2.2.1 is one of the few quantitative indicators that can measure how policies may have a real impact on land rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities.** It seems odd that only target has been set for Indonesia and not for the other programme countries, as this is likely to be just as relevant elsewhere. With the current political situation in Brazil, in which demarcation processes are increasingly slowing down or subject to hampering and controversies, it would be good to keep track of the numbers and hectares of land being documented and claimed (something ISA is already doing). Having said so, the numbers may not represent the effect on local communities, and need to be monitored carefully. RFN could consider a qualitative indicator to assess the consequences of successful land claims.

**Output example:**

In 2017, RFN reported that AMAN had mapped a total of 9.3 million hectares of indigenous territories. RFN partners gained recognition through village forest licenses (hutan desa) over an area totalling 18 366 ha. Additional 10 communities also gained recognition by the government. The total number of social forest licenses reached 1.5 million ha by the end of 2017.

**Output 2.3: Civil society, including indigenous peoples' organisations, has advocated for full and effective, gender-sensitive participation in REDD+ processes and for the implementation of Cancun safeguards**

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.3.1 # of advocacy actions for the implementation of Cancun safeguards in the programme period	Indonesia: 0 Brazil: 0 Peru: 0 Myanmar: 0 Colombia: 0 DRC: 0	Indonesia: 5 Brazil: 10 Peru: 10 Myanmar: 5 Colombia: 11 DRC: 5	Indonesia: 1 Brazil: 2 Peru: 2 Myanmar: 1 Colombia: 2,3 DRC: 1	Indonesia: 1 Brazil: 3 <b>Peru: 1</b> Myanmar: 1 <b>DRC: 0</b>	Indonesia: 1 Brazil: 4 <b>Peru: 0</b> Myanmar: 3 Colombia: 4 <b>DRC: 0</b>
2.3.2 Level of participation of civil society including Ind. Peoples org. in Redd+ processes)		Indonesia: 5 Brazil: 5 Peru: 4 Myanmar: 5 Colombia: 5 DRC: 5	Not defined	Indonesia: 3 Brazil: 3 Peru: 3 Myanmar: 2/3 Colombia: - DRC: -	Indonesia: 3 Brazil: 3 Peru: 3 Myanmar: - Colombia: 3 DRC: 2/3
2.3.3 # of meetings in REDD+ relevant international institutions RFN and partners have attended	0	10	2	2	3
2.3.3 # of proposals on instruments for improved forest management adopted by decision-makers due to civil society's competence and capacity in Peru	0	3	Advances each year	No report	No report

**Progress on this output is largely on track, and considered moderately satisfactory.** The reason for this is because targets have not been met in DRC and Peru for indicator 2.3.1, and there is no defined annual target for 2.3.2. In addition, RFN had defined an indicator 2.3.3 which was not reported on (*# of proposals on instruments for improved forest management adopted by decision-makers due to civil society's competence and capacity in Peru*), and substituted with outcome indicator 2.2.

**As previously explained, the mismanagement case has impeded progress in DRC.** In Peru, one of the local partners is coordinating the REDD+ civil society group (*Grupo Red*), a civil society observatory that gathers information relevant on the implementation of REDD+ policies. In 2017 the observatory was operational, however, no apparent explanation was provided why targets were not reached. It appears from the 2017 results reporting that DAR has suggested different indicators for reporting on this output, however, this has not been included in RFN's overall framework.

**Output example:**  
 In 2017, the Colombian government presented a proposal for the regulation of FPIC, which suggested that prior consultation should not be required for projects included in the National Development Plan. RFN's partner, the national Indigenous organisation (ONIC), organized a national mobilization to protest against this proposal and to request that the government respect the ILO Convention 169 and the constitutional rights of indigenous peoples in Colombia.

**Two of the indicators for this output have been revised in the new results framework,** based on a recognition by RFN that the indicators did not sufficiently monitor the progress made. It is a challenging output to measure, and it is evident from the current indicators that qualitative aspects of the output is not captured. It is, similar to other outputs, mostly quantifying number of actions without addressing the impact or quality of those actions.

**RFN is also reporting separately on this output,** through a separate table that was introduced in 2017. It provides a good overview of the seven safeguards and level of implementation at country level. However, reporting becomes increasingly complex when utilising four different formats to report: narrative report, logical framework, policy assessment tool and Cancun safeguards tool. There may be potential for simplifying reporting formats.

**Output 2.4: Indigenous peoples' representatives and other relevant civil society members, both men and women, have acquired the necessary competence and capacity to effectively promote improved forest governance**

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.4.1 # of community members, indigenous peoples' representatives or civil society members, both men and women, trained to influence forest governance	Indonesia: 0 DRC: 0 Brazil: 0 Peru: 0 Myanmar: 0 Colombia: 0	Indonesia: 10 DRC: 600 Brazil: 40 Peru: 50 Myanmar: 100 Colombia: 60	Indonesia: 1 DRC: 2, 4, 5 Brazil: 20 Peru: 1 workshop Colombia: 20 Myanmar: -	Indonesia: 8 <b>DRC: 0</b> Brazil: 23 Peru: 1 Myanmar: 20	Indonesia: 7 <b>DRC: 2</b> Brazil: 23 Peru: 51 Myanmar: 59 Colombia: 20
2.4.2 # of regional/global partner meetings for information sharing and capacity building between RFN and partners, with gender balanced participation	0	5	1	1	2
2.4.3 # of proposals developed on instruments for improved forest management adopted by decision makers etc.	0	3	1	1	1

**Progress on this output is considered on track, and performance is satisfactory.** The only country where target is behind annual target is DRC, which is due to the above-mentioned mismanagement case. Again, the indicators are mostly quantitative and do not encompass the qualitative aspects of training. Adding to this, it would be good to streamline indicators, the reporting and targets vary to what degree no. of seminars vs. no. of participants is reported.

**The indicators may not be sufficient to fully grasp progress on the output.** Indicator 2.4.3 is not in the results framework, but was taken from the results framework report. According to RFN, it has been replaced by a new indicator under output 2.3, in RFN's new results framework (2018-2020). If so, it means that the only two indicators for reporting on this output is no. of men and women that has been trained, and no. of partner meetings. In many countries, the quality of capacity building may be good. This is not sufficient to assess whether the participants have acquired "the necessary competence and capacity to effectively promote improved forest governance". In an internal RFN travel report from Peru, one of the major findings is that capacity training is insufficient towards one of the indigenous groups. This highlights the need to monitor closely the quality of such trainings.

**Output example:**  
 In November 2017, 45 representatives from RFN's partners in Indonesia, Colombia, Brazil and DRC participated in a training workshop in Myanmar on Sustainable Forest Management by Indigenous Peoples, organized by POINT in Yangon. The purpose was to share experiences on forest issues and REDD safeguards.

*Output 2.5: Indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities in targeted areas have developed models for sustainable forest management which are gender-sensitive and reflect community aspirations*

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.5.1 # of models developed	Indonesia: 0 Peru: 0 Colombia: 0	Indonesia: 50 Peru: 3 Colombia: 3	Indonesia: 10 Peru: progress each year Colombia: progress each year	Indonesia: 17 Peru: 1 Colombia: 0	Indonesia: 17 Peru: 3 Colombia: 0

**Progress on this output is considered on track, and performance is satisfactory.** Colombia was not part of the programme in 2016, and is in process of developing models although not yet finalised. DRC did originally include this output in its country programme, however, RFN decided to remove this output from the DRC programme. There has been no progress in DRC on this output.

**Output example:**  
 In 2017, the development of three Peruvian models for sustainable forest development were initiated by local partners. One of the partners, FENAMAD, implemented a model called "REDD Indígena Amazónico" in three local communities. This entailed developing Life Plans among the indigenous residents, revise local bylaws and begin implementation of sustainable resource management plans within their territories.

**Output 2.6:** *Proposals for country-specific finance mechanisms to support sustainable community-based forest management, including the establishment and management of indigenous territories, are promoted in relevant forums*

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.6.1 # of proposals to access REDD+ funds in Indonesia	0	3	One each year from 2018	0 (finance mechanism not operational)	0 (finance mechanism not operational)
2.6.2 # of proposals for improved access of indigenous and other forest depended people to the Amazon Fund or other finance mechanisms established for them in Brazil	0	5	1	1 (advocacy input)	2

**Progress on this output is considered largely on track, and performance is satisfactorily.** Despite the fact that Indonesia is behind track on implementation, this is caused by the fact that the finance mechanism is yet operational. One of RFN's partners has provided input and recommendations to decision makers regarding the establishment of the mechanism and its legal foundation, although this is not encompassed by the indicator.

**In Brazil, an advocacy input was reported in 2016 for the Amazon Fund to cater for procedures to include indigenous peoples' participation.** The indicator encompasses both advocacy proposals (in 2016) and project proposals. In 2017, two proposals were submitted, beyond the annual target (1). As of now, only two indigenous associations have been able to access funds directly from the Fund, due to strict managerial requirements. However, several "indigenista" NGOs have accessed funds on behalf of and in collaboration with indigenous associations – including ISA.

**Output example:**

In 2017, two projects benefiting indigenous territories were approved by the Amazon fund: one in the Xingu region to the Kayapo people, and a second proposal to be implemented by the NGO CTI. The grants had a total value of approx. NOK 44.5 million. RFN's local partner, ISA, has been instrumental in providing input that allows for indigenous peoples to access the Fund. Both proposals concerns elaboration and implementation of management plans in indigenous territories.

**Output 2.7:** Policy inputs are provided to key REDD+ donors such as Norway on the rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities and the protection of natural ecosystems in their REDD+ policies

Indicator	Baseline (2015)	Final target (2020)	Annual target	2016	2017
2.7.1 # of written policy inputs to key donors	0	25	5	5	9

**Progress on this output is considered on track, and performance is satisfactory.** A number of written policy inputs have been submitted to board members of the GCF regarding Cancun safeguards, as well as policy input to Germany and UK regarding IP's rights and finance for REDD+ within FCPF. RFN has worked closely with civil society actors regarding GCF, such as Tebtebba, Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy, and has attended several forums and board meetings of the GCF to develop policy input for REDD+.

**Output example:**

In 2017, the GCF adopted a Request for proposals for REDD+, in which applicant countries must provide information on key UNFCCC policies such as Cancun Safeguards and GCF Guidelines. The request for proposals includes several measures relevant for indigenous peoples, including a requirement for grievance redress mechanism for REDD+. RFN and other NGOs provided several written inputs to the policy in advance, and attended two GCF board meetings where it was discussed. RFN also attended a GCF workshop in Bali along with other NGOs, to provide suggestions to the GCF board on payments for REDD+ emissions reductions.

# 5. Overall programme rating

The programme is rated satisfactory (4.8 out of 6).

The Programme scores the highest on relevance and efficiency, and have positive impact on beneficiaries. But financial sustainability of partners is a challenge, and monitoring of results is not sufficient.




Figure 3: Programme rating summary

**Effectiveness:** The program as a whole is largely on-track at output level, but struggles to attain its objectives on outcome level. Despite a comprehensive results framework and indicators, the available reporting reveals shortcomings. This is mostly due to the fact that the link between outputs and outcomes is not clear, and it there is a "missing middle" in terms of the direct outcomes achieved at country level (but not defined by the results framework). Consequently, many achievements are not sufficiently monitored or reflected in outputs/outcomes and corresponding indicators.

**Sustainability:** The primary challenge to sustainability is the financial dependency on RFN. For example, Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari in Myanmar has its finance staff 100% paid by a RFN project. Key management positions like this should be covered by overhead. Long-term partnerships create financial dependency, and may not be sustainable in the long run. There should be a clear strategy to exit areas where the role of the RFN partner is less relevant (e.g. related to develop social entrepreneurship for communities, developing supply chains for niche community products, etc.). Clear exit strategies are largely non-existent. Having said so, CAT is a relatively new partner of RFN, and it may be beneficial to strengthen CAT's management capabilities before introducing more donors. There is also a difference between sustainability of results, as opposed to financial sustainability of partners. The former is often strong, whereas the latter may be challenging in many cases – also a general challenge for many NGOs.

**Relevance:** The program concept is to a large extent well designed and realistic. Programme activities are highly relevant to local beneficiaries, and indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities clearly benefit from the project. The result hierarchy is to a lesser degree logical and coherent, as the link between outputs and outcomes is considered weak. A main challenge with for the two outcomes defined by the programme is attribution, and how to measure RFN's impact on policy processes.

Review questions under each OECD DAC criteria were developed based on the DAC guidelines and the Terms of Reference. The Project performance under each review question was rated with a score from 1 to 6 where six is the best. No weighting was applied for the overall rating i.e. all questions and criteria were given equal weight.

**Efficiency:** RFN scores high on efficiency, and has a clear added value to the partner. RFN's experience-sharing, supervision, flexibility and openness are valued as an approach that empowers

partners and wider stakeholders. Expenditures are in line with budget, with some adjustments. NOK 11.23 million remained unspent at the end of 2017. This is largely due to gradual needs throughout the programme cycle, as well as three reported cases of mismanagement that led to a freeze in disbursement and negatively impacted budget expenditure and performance.

**Impact: The impact is likely beyond what is captured by the results framework and the outcomes utilised.** The programme has to a large extent been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action, and has responded adequately to unexpected negative side-effects such as changing political circumstances and mismanagement.

**Rating is based on qualitative assessment of overall achievements of the program,** as defined by the review questions and operational questions (see table below). The consolidated assessment is largely based on data from fieldworks in Brazil and Indonesia and contrasting of these, triangulated against data from document reviews and interviews with RNF programme staff. The scoring is an attempt to aggregate findings across countries:

Table 3: Rating of the programme according to the OECD-DAC criteria

Consolidated programme rating			Brazil	Indonesia
<b>1. Effectiveness</b>	<b>To what extent is RFN and partners implementation on track to achieving the programme's outcomes?</b>	<b>Score</b>		
1.1	To what extent were objectives, indicators and milestones met/ likely to be met?	4,0	4,0	4,0
1.2	To what extent have program activities contributed to the adaptation of policies/safeguards to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities?	5,0	5,0	4,0
1.3	If there were unexpected challenges that constrained the attainment of the project objectives, has it been possible to resolve them? To what extent?	5,0	6,0	4,0
1.4	To what extent have program activities contributed to the adaptation of policies to protect natural ecosystems in REDD+ projects or other forest sector projects?	5,0	5,0	5,0
<b>Average Effectiveness Score</b>		<b>4,8</b>	<b>5,0</b>	<b>4,3</b>
<b>2. Sustainability</b>	<b>Should RFN and partners do anything differently in the remainder of the programme period, to strengthen achievements towards the outcomes?</b>	<b>Score</b>		
2.1	Is there a link between policies and realities on the ground? To what extent are policies implemented, violated or ignored?	4,0	4,0	4,0
2.2	To what extent have a gender sensitive approach been assured for the recipients and local beneficiaries?	5,0	6,0	4,0
2.3	To what extent is there a clear exit strategy to ensure sustainability?	3,5	3,0	4,0
<b>Average Sustainability Score</b>		<b>4,2</b>	<b>4,3</b>	<b>4,0</b>
<b>3. Relevance</b>	<b>Is there reason to re-consider the planned outcomes and outputs?</b>	<b>Score</b>		
3.1	To what extent was the project concept well designed and realistic?	5,0	5,0	4,0
3.2	To what extent are program activities regarded as relevant to local beneficiaries?	6,0	6,0	6,0
3.3	To what extent is the result hierarchy logical and coherent, i.e. clear link between outputs and outcomes?	3,0	3,0	3,0
3.4	To what extent are RFN's activities relevant for the overall program objectives? Are RFN working with the right partners to achieve its program outcomes?	6,0	6,0	5,0
3.5	To what extent have indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities benefited from the project?	5,0	6,0	4,0
3.6	To what extent have partner NGOs benefited from the project?	6,0	6,0	6,0
3.7	Are there other indicators and/or outcomes/outputs that should be considered underneath the program?	3,0	3,0	3,0
<b>Average Relevance Score</b>		<b>4,9</b>	<b>5,0</b>	<b>4,4</b>
<b>4. Efficiency</b>	<b>What is RFN's added value to the partner? Should we do anything differently in order to strengthen the added value towards our partners?</b>	<b>Score</b>		
4.1	To what extent were activities done cost-efficiently?	4,5	5,0	4,0
4.2	To what extent were available resources optimally used?	5,0	6,0	4,0
4.3	To what extent was implementation on track, i.e. timely and according to planned pathway?	5,0	5,0	4,0
4.4	To what extent is RFN contributing with more than financial support to local partners?	6,0	6,0	5,0
<b>Average Efficiency Score</b>		<b>5,1</b>	<b>5,5</b>	<b>4,3</b>
<b>5. Impact</b>	<b>Has the program been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action? What are the key lessons learned so far in the program implementation?</b>	<b>Score</b>		
5.1	What is the likelihood of the program to attain its impact indicators?	4,0	4,0	4,0
5.2	To what extent have program activities contributed to the recognition of the role of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities in protecting the rainforest?	5,5	6,0	5,0
5.3	Has the program adequately addressed any unexpected negative side effects?	5,0	6,0	4,0
<b>Average Impact Score</b>		<b>4,8</b>	<b>5,3</b>	<b>4,3</b>
<b>Overall Programme Score</b>		<b>4,8</b>	<b>5,0</b>	<b>4,3</b>

## 5.1 Effectiveness

Satisfactory: 4.8 out of 6.

**The program as a whole is largely on-track at output level, but struggles to attain its objectives on outcome level.** Despite a comprehensive results framework and indicators, the available reporting reveals shortcomings. This is mostly due to the fact that the link between outputs and outcomes is not clear, and it there is a "missing middle" in terms of the direct outcomes achieved at country level (but not defined by the results framework). Consequently, many achievements are not sufficiently monitored or reflected in outputs/outcomes and corresponding indicators. To what extent the programme is accountable for impact and likelihood of impact, is not addressed. RFN writes in the Results Framework Document that RFN can only be hold accountable for outputs, not outcomes.

See chapter 4 for a more detailed review of progress towards programme outcomes.

**The programme has contributed positively to many policy processes to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities.** In many cases, the work is more about "damage control" to avoid political decisions that could cause negative impact on the programme outcomes, rather than promoting new policies.

**RFN and partners have maintained a flexible approach,** and has been able to mobilise on short notice pertaining to political developments that could cause negative effects. There have also been three cases of mismanagement (one in DRC and two in Indonesia) that have impacted negatively on implementation. RFN has been able to respond adequately to this.

**RFN is continuously tracking relevant national policies through its Policy Framework Assessment tool,** and partners are working extensively to influence the adaptation of these. It is not possible to measure exactly the extent of influence RFN and partners have had, however, the high significance of RFN and partners was substantiated by many sources in both Indonesia and Brazil. There is little doubt that without the active monitoring and advocacy actions undertaken by RFN and partners, policies to protect indigenous peoples' rights and protection of natural ecosystems underneath the REDD+ architecture would have looked very different.

## 5.2 Sustainability

Moderately satisfactory: 4.2 out of 6.

Sustainability is understood as sustainable outcomes of the programme, as well as the (financial) sustainability of the partners and/or to what extent benefits of an activity are likely to continue after RFN funding has been withdrawn.

**The link between policies and realities on the ground is not always consistent across countries.** In both Brazil and Indonesia, certain policies have real and relevant impact on local communities, for instance relating to accessing funds from finance mechanisms such as the Amazon Fund, or implementation of social forestry scheme in Indonesia. In Brazil, law enforcement for combatting illegal logging has been one important measure, whereas this has been very weak in Indonesia due to rent-seeking behaviour of police and military forces. However, REDD+ architecture remains a highly theoretical debate in many cases. And there are many examples on how national policies may be contradictory, for instance relating to indigenous' rights and concessions provided to timber companies or others. Implementation and definition/interpretation of REDD+ policies is subject to political controversies and strong interests from different groups. Many of the achievements in Brazil would likely never happened without the continuous monitoring and advocacy actions by Brazilian civil society. Often, the work of NGOs is more about "damage control" than advocating for new policies. Despite many achievements in Brazil, there is cause for concern what the current elections may entail in terms of REDD+ and indigenous peoples' rights (see Annex 1 for Brazil country case).

**A lot of the REDD+ policy discussions are still theoretical,** and are more likely to have a concrete impact on local communities in the longer term. The most immediate impact on local communities is related to capacity building, which has had a concrete and tangible impact on local beneficiaries and communities. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the real impact of this is not properly monitored within the current results framework. Concrete results for local beneficiaries mostly relate to 1) access to funding mechanisms such as the Amazon Fund and REDD Early Movers (REM), and 2) land rights. However, the impact of the

latter is yet to be substantiated. As an example, demarcation of indigenous territories has been included as an important measure for forest preservation in the Brazilian REDD+ strategy, however, at the same time demarcation processes have slowed down.

**The programme has to a large degree ensured a gender sensitive approach for recipients and local beneficiaries.** In Indonesia, RFN's partners have contributed to empowering women's groups in villages, as well as undertaken training on gender-sensitive facilitation, facilitator-led discussions during women's group activities and empowerment of women to channel their voices at village meetings. This is largely contributed by a series of gender assessment and capacity building conducted by RFN. So far, the focus of gender empowerment is through promoting women group up to speaking in the public meetings while local cultural setting may need to be considered. In male dominating culture, empowering women alone may not be sufficient, improving awareness of male beneficiaries to consider women and their voice in village meetings is necessary. Perempuan AMAN with its own approach also strongly focuses only on women groups while there is a need for more natural interaction with male beneficiaries. It is important for RFN to ensure its intervention is maintaining a natural interaction between women and men beneficiaries and avoiding the creation of new identity that separating adat men and women through an institutional set up. Brazil has shown further progress. RFN's partners have worked consistently on empowerment of female indigenous leaders over many years. This is now bearing fruits, and female participation and leadership within the indigenous movement is growing. Adding to this, traditional "machista" indigenous communities are increasingly accepting that women take such a leading role. Some of the most influential indigenous spokespersons in Brazil when it comes to climate change and REDD+, are women. Female participation is also an important focus of RFN in other program countries.

**There is to a lesser degree a clear exit strategy to ensure sustainability.** There are many impressive benefits from the programme that are likely to have a lasting effect for beneficiaries after RFN's funding ends. The partner NGOs, however, are still highly dependent of RFN's contribution, and there is no clear overall exit strategy despite RFN's guidelines on this topic.<sup>8</sup> In RFN's programme document this is also highlighted, and RFN explicitly states that lack of funding would impede the ability of civil society to engage actively with REDD+ processes, and highlights the importance of securing funding from national governments, multilateral initiatives and. The long-term perspective is that local communities and partner NGOs will be financed through national REDD+ mechanisms, governments and multilateral institutions. But despite the fact that partners such as ISA is now receiving substantial funding from the Amazon Fund, the institution is still highly dependent of RFN.

Financial sustainability of local NGOs, i.e. diversifying fundraising, poses a paradox: on the one hand one main donor (RFN) enables partners to concentrate precious time and resources on work vs. fundraising (and donor reporting). On the other hand, it also entails a greater extent of dependency on RFN. As an example, ISA has been a consistent recipient of funding from RFN over more than 20 years, and RFN covered 18% of ISA's consolidated budget in 2016 (13% the following year). RCA as a network was both initiated and 100% funded by RFN, and would likely cease to exist without RFN. Having said so, one of RFN's former main partners in Indonesia, AMAN, is now receiving funding directly from Norad and is no longer reliant on RFN funding. This is a success story in terms of capacity building of local partners to enable them to fundraise internationally.

**The main reason why the Brazil programme has performed so well, is that it builds on a 20+ year's partnership** between RFN, ISA and RCA (and members). The position of NGO partners in undertaking advocacy actions is not established over the span of two years. There is a continuity in the programme, which is highly positive and enables the programme to be cost-efficient and effective. On the other hand, long-term partnerships create the risk of financial dependency, and may not be financially sustainable in the long run. It is important that RFN is conscious to exit areas where the role of the RFN partner is less relevant, and a more suitable organisation could potentially substitute RFN (for instance related to develop social entrepreneurship for communities, developing supply chains for niche community products, etc.). In Brazil, there is clearly potential for more joint efforts with the government pertaining to training of indigenous communities on climate change. And in Indonesia, there is potential for scaling-up for wider impact and outreach of RFN partners: expansion in other areas similar to those in areas where RFN partners have been successful, and to support provincial government through training and improved coordination. RFN is now focusing on improved coordination in DRC, and arranging exchanges with Brazil could be a way of strengthening learning within the programme.

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<sup>8</sup> See RFN's Project Manual, p.11.

## 5.3 Relevance

Satisfactory: 4.9 out of 6.

**The program concept is to a large extent well designed and realistic.** It is based on a participatory approach, and has been developed with partners to be as relevant as possible. Programme activities are regarded as highly relevant to local beneficiaries, and indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities have clearly benefited from the project. Capacity-building of indigenous peoples' in Brazil has for instance been very important in enabling their participation in climate-related forums, both nationally and internationally (see Annex 1 for case study on Brazil). In addition, the training has been important for indigenous communities to understand how local phenomenon impacting subsistence agriculture and way of life (i.e. change of harvest, unpredictable rainfall, temperature variations, etc.), relates to climate change. RFN has also provided added value to partner NGOs in terms of managerial capacity and training, networking (particularly on the global level) as well as technical input and coordination relating to REDD+. The fact that the Norwegian government is one of the most prominent donors within this area and has signed bilateral agreements with many of the program countries, is one of the reasons why RFN has an important role to play in terms of local partnerships. RFN maintains a good balance between professional NGOs and "less professional" indigenous associations, which ensures both legitimacy and professionalism. The programme has in all likelihood had great impact on the REDD+ agenda both internationally and in many forest countries.

**RFN's activities are considered highly relevant for the overall program objectives,** to the extent that NGOs can be expected to deliver on the responsibilities of national governments. As previously mentioned, RFN's activities are highly relevant, and has in all likelihood had great impact on the REDD+ agenda both internationally and in many forest countries. Data from both Brazil and Indonesia substantiates that RFN's interventions have strengthened indigenous peoples' access to REDD+ funding, development and implementation of safeguards as well as strengthening of land rights. RFN is working with some of the most professional partners within REDD+, at the same time as a good balance is maintained to also work with "less professional" associations that represent indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities. This balance ensures both legitimacy and professionalism, both needed to achieve the program outcomes. Participation of indigenous representatives at international REDD+ forums such as COP and others, has been an important contribution of the programme. Although appreciated by both government representatives and the UN, it would not have been possible both financially and practically without the work of RFN and partners in terms of preparation, accompaniment and financial support.

**RFN's partners have worked extensively on empowering female indigenous representatives.** Data from Brazil suggest that such training has had a tremendous impact on participation and dialogue, but also in terms of gender equity among local indigenous communities. Unfortunately, these results are not properly reflected in RFN's results reporting, and could be further highlighted for instance by formulating an intermediate outcome on gender equity.

**The current programme outcomes are high-level outcomes,** with only long-term or indirect effects that can be attributed by programme. An outcome is usually a change that occurred **because** of the programme, measurable and time-limited. Hence, RFN should consider revising the results framework to better reflect this, for instance by introducing "intermediary outcomes" relating to effects such as 1) effect of capacity building of indigenous peoples (including multiplication effect), 2) empowerment of female indigenous leaders and 3) adding value to national institutions or people such as parliaments, governments, law enforcement units, corruption watch, judiciary, etc.

## 5.4 Efficiency

Satisfactory: 5.1 out of 6.

**RFN have an added value to the partner with some potential joint activities to strengthen partnership.** RFN's experience-sharing, supervision, flexibility and openness are valued as an approach that empowers partners and wider stakeholders. RFN staff's experience of living with forest-dependent peoples, and their ability to speak local languages, are valuable for the contextualization and adaptation of global solutions to meet local needs. RFN brings an important added value to the partners, not only in terms of funding, but also in terms of joint policy initiatives (in particular on the global level), empowerment/capacity building, gender sensitivity and an overall flexible approach with high relevance to the local context. RFN is by several partners in Indonesia regarded as different from other "typical" donors,

in a positive sense and this partnership can be strengthened by having a joint-campaign and a knowledge sharing by RFN global team in capacity building activities in Indonesia. The activities are regarded as relevant not only among professional NGOs and government officials, but also among indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities. RFN's support for the development of new institutions responds to the institutional gap, i.e. organisations whose role is key to achieve overall program outcomes. The establishment of Perempuan AMAN in Indonesia was driven by the lack of attention to the empowerment of Adat women in Indonesia. Similarly the establishment of Madani in Indonesia was driven by the national lack of coordination among NGOs in the issue of land use and forestry.


**Strengthened country level monitoring can mitigate internal risks and ensure the achievement of partnerships in countries where NGO financial capacity is still relatively weak.** While RFN's presence in a country may be considered costly and resource-intensive, its absence in countries with low financial fiduciary standards such as Indonesia and DRC has been detrimental to programme implementation. The fact that RFN has uncovered mismanagement is an indication of good management systems. However, it could also mean that RFN did not undertake proper due diligence before entering into a contractual partnership in the first place. Some of the programme countries could benefit from strengthened country level presence, such as the country office in DRC. A continuous presence can mitigate such risk. A semi-independent management unit or an evaluation- and learning-monitoring unit for a whole country program could be used as an alternative to an RFN country office, enhancing learning across RFN partners as well as improving the coherence of the national program.

**RFN's investment in national communications can be used to leverage its partners' intended impact.** RFN partners' communication strategy may not be as crucial at project level as at national level, where the audience is wide and diverse.

With the increasing number of good case practices at village level, RFN has the opportunity to use its success stories on the ground as a communication material to persuade stakeholders, including private companies, to adopt and adapt the approach to avoiding deforestation while living in harmony with Adat and forest-dependent peoples. Currently some RFN partners have some capacity for external communications such as advocacy and campaigns, however there is insufficient attention to internal communication among RFN partners in the country. Madani in Indonesia has played this coordination role, but such action is not documented as an explicit RFN country-program communication strategy to improve the synergy among RFN partners.

**So far the spend realized across the six priority countries is in line with the project's budget,** with some adjustments. Indonesia receives slightly higher budget and its actual spend is slightly higher than the project budget (see figure below). Colombia and Brazil's actual spend is also higher than their initial budgets, indicating transfers from some of Myanmar and DRC's financial resources, whose actual spend is below their initial budget. Lack of absorptive capacity on the part of RFN partners in DRC may result in actual spend being lower than expected. Expansion into eastern Indonesia, especially Papuan bioregions, may be driving the actual spend beyond the initial budget. In addition, there is crosscutting spending whose coverage is global and cannot be broken down into countries.

Figure 4: Program budget vs. actual expenditures per country



**So far gap between total budget and actual spending of the programme until 20<sup>th</sup> August 2018 is minimum** (see figure below). **There was** an underspending in 2017 that was a rolled over in 2016 but this has been handled well. The auditors' report a total of NOK 11.23 million remained unspent at the end of 2017. This is largely due to the above-mentioned mismanagement cases, as well as gradual needs throughout the programme cycle. However, this seems being tackled in 2018 hence the gap is around 14%. With the additional funding from Norad in 2018-2020, RFN needs to make sure that there is sufficient absorption capacity within the programme.





Figure 5: Programme's actual spend until August 2018 vs. budget

**To date, Right based REDD+ has spent and concentrated its resources on the national policies and grassroots level development.** With 40% of the total spend in the period of 2016-2017 Outcome 2 is so far the largest spend of the program where the activities are happening at the national and grassroots levels (see figure below). Two components from output 2 with the largest spend are capacity improved related to forest governance and policies for indigenous peoples' rights. This shows that attention is given to policy development and capacity building. Total spend up till 20<sup>th</sup> August is NOK 65.3 million, 47.4% of the total budget allocated. However, RFN recently received an additional grant of NOK 48.88 million for three additional projects (2018-2020) underneath the current programme agreement.

Figure 6: Actual Spend by program output (2016-2017)



**There is no indication that the use of funds at project level was inefficient, however, there may be a need for reconciliation of figures.** As an example, underspending on the Brazil programme was in 2016 explained with 1) favourable exchange rates and 2) rolled over funds from 2016. However, budget utilisation in local currency (BRL) was in 2016 reported at 100.3%. And in 2017, only NOK 3.7 million out of NOK 4.9 million was spent, resulting in a budget utilization rate of 76%, whereas the allocated budgets in local currency (BRL) were fully spent by partners. Some minor confusion were discovered in how partners (notably, RCA) reports and differentiates between Norad funding and NICFI funding. This has been clarified, but may be an indication on the need for further harmonising reporting between the two programs.

**The actual spend on output 2.6 on financial mechanism is only 1%** and this needs more attention if the project aims to build the sustainability of the communities, i.e. building the capacity of indigenous peoples with less donor dependency.

## 5.5 Impact

Satisfactory: 4.8 out of 6.

**The impact of the programme is likely beyond what is captured by the results framework and the outcomes utilised.**

The current programme outcomes are very high-level, as they are long-term and can only be attributed as indirect effects of the programme. Outcomes with a more direct and measurable effect from outputs, are not defined.

**The programme has to a large extent been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action.** Partners of RFN are to a large extent able to respond on current political issues and mobilise. As an example, in Brazil, ISA has through its long partnership with RFN and NICFI-funded programme, been able to

undertake a systemised monitoring and analysis of political and legislative proposals on federal level for more than 20 years. This intimate insight and close knowledge of political processes makes ISA able to mobilise on short notice when new legislation poses a threat to preservation of forests and indigenous' rights. During the fieldwork in Brazil, KPMG witnessed how ISA and RCA were able to mobilise participation of indigenous peoples to participate in a federal Court to support the continuation of an ongoing process of demarcation (FUNAI was prosecuted to stop the process). This constitutes one small example on the flexible approach of the programme, and how advocacy actions may take place (see picture).



Still, there could be further potential to exploit collaboration with governmental agencies (for instance in Brazil pertaining to training and outreach to indigenous peoples on climate change issues). And in Indonesia, the contribution of RFN

programme activities towards recognition of the role of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities in protecting the rainforest is significant in some locations in Jambi and West Sumatra. The programme has contributed to this end, in particular in Jambi and West Sumatra Province, through the work of KKI Warsi. The work of Perempuan AMAN has just begun, and it has the potential to improve the recognition of women's rights in the development of relevant policy.

[Brazil, Brasilia: Indigenous representatives participating in federal court to express support for an ongoing demarcation process.](#)

Photo: Knut Lakså

**The programme maintains a flexible approach and adequately addresses any unexpected negative side effects.** RFN has responded adequately to financial mismanagement, and has strengthened the financial management of other existing partners. This has obviously taken a lot of time and resources away from the main work, thereby negatively affecting progress. Still, RFN follows the development at country level closely, and has good procedures for adequately responding to unexpected events.

# 6. Annexes

## 6.1 Annex 1: Case Study Brazil

### 6.1.1 Programme description

Brazil is widely recognized to be one of the foremost countries in terms of recognizing indigenous rights and territories, as well as promoting sustainable forest management and the REDD+ agenda. Despite these positive developments over the past decade, there have been political setbacks over the past few years. The result is an increase in deforestation rates. Adding to this, the process of demarcation of Indigenous Territories have slowed down, and has been subject to political debate and controversies. Threats and violence against indigenous leaders are increasing<sup>9</sup>, and many civil society actors expect the political situation to become even more difficult in the coming years - not the least dependant on the outcome of the general elections in October 2018. The favourite candidate leading on the polls is Mr Jair Bolsonaro (PSC-RJ), a candidate that has publically stated that he wants Brazil to resign the Paris Agreement and intends to end all demarcation processes of indigenous territories.<sup>10</sup>

The RFN programme aims at enabling civil society to organise and speak up against the threats to climate and environmental legislation in Brazil. The programme has two target groups:

- 1) **Politicians** with direct power to influence national policies; and
- 2) **Indigenous people**, who need to be prepared for conducting advocacy in climate issues.

The programme focuses on capacity-building of indigenous people and advocacy targeting important legislation and bills, in an attempt to ensure that indigenous peoples' rights will be respected and deforestation rates will slow down. Indigenous people are considered key agents for change, and the programme focuses on promoting their participation in relevant climate change forums nationally and internationally.

The programme is implemented through *Instituto Socioambiental (ISA)* and *Rede de Cooperação Amazônica (RCA)*, two long-term partners of RFN in Brazil. ISA has been an NGO partner for over 20 years of RFN, whereas RCA is an umbrella organisation representing 10 indigenous and four "indigenista" NGOs. RFN was the prime initiator for establishing RCA some 10-15 years ago to cater for improved coordination among its Brazilian partners. RCA is not a legal entity per se, but has a secretariat hosted by one of its members, *Instituto de Pesquisa e Formação Indígena (Iepé)*.

### 6.1.2 Overall programme rating

The programme is rated satisfactory (5 out of 6).

The programme is relevant and timely, and clearly demonstrates a clear impact from advocacy work undertaken by the partners. However, it also shows how challenging reaching impact on outcome level as this depends on many other processes as well. In short, RFN and partners can hardly be held responsible for lack of impact on outcome level, something RFN also acknowledges. In the introduction to the Baseline and Expected Results document, RFN states that "all outcomes are above RFN's accountability ceiling."<sup>11</sup>

It could be argued that the outcomes of the programme are actually beyond what RFN and partners can hope to achieve, as the outcomes are the sole responsibility of the government. Still, despite this, there is

<sup>9</sup> See for instance CIMI's annual report on violence towards indigenous peoples:  
<https://cimi.org.br/pub/Relatorio2016/relatorio2016.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> <http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticias/reuters/2018/09/03/bolsonaro-diz-que-pode-retirar-brasil-do-acordo-de-paris-se-for-eleito.htm>

<sup>11</sup> Baseline and Expected Results for "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the Rainforest": p. 3

clear evidence that ISA and RCA has had a tremendous impact on political advocacy work, and is claimed by different sources to have been instrumental not only in advocating for improved safe-guards and measures for REDD+, but the actual establishment of Amazonas Fund and REDD+ at the international stage. Similarly, there are anecdotal evidence from different sources that RCA has been instrumental in the demarcation process of several indigenous territories, as well as establishing procedures (best practices) for how free and prior informed consent (FPIC) should be undertaken vis-à-vis indigenous communities. These practices have been adopted by the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), in addition to other governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Public Affairs. Important policies regarding indigenous peoples, such as the PNGATI<sup>12</sup> (National Policy for the environmental and territorial management of Indigenous Territories), as well as the safeguards and modalities of the Amazon Fund, have to a large extent been designed based on input from civil society – in particular ISA and RCA.

The programme clearly responds to the strategic objectives of RFN and the Norwegian Climate and Forest initiative. There is however, a risk that the outcome of the current political turmoil could be a severe setback for the accomplishments by civil society in the past, and actually endanger the possibility to continue working if worst comes to worst. There is also a risk associated with the financial dependency of RFN, as RFN contributes some 13% of ISA's consolidated budget and 100% to that of RCA. Hence, although the programme scores satisfactory on most accounts, sustainability scores slightly lower (see figure below).



Figure 7: Brazil programme rating summary

### 6.1.3 Lessons learned and key recommendations

- ✓ **The programme clearly depicts how long-term continuity is necessary to get real impact.** Very few of the advocacy achievements made by ISA and RCA would have been possible if the programme was not building on a long partnership history and the continuation of work across several short-term programmes/projects.
- ✓ **The position of ISA and RCA clearly shows that they are the right partners for RFN.** In particular ISA have been important in the design and set-up of REDD+ and related policies in Brazil and internationally, and has taken a leading role on behalf of civil society in the Amazon Fund Guidance

<sup>12</sup> Política Nacional de Gestão Territorial e Ambiental de Terras Indígenas - PNGATI

Committee (COFA<sup>13</sup>). A concrete result of this is improved participation and availability of funds to indigenous associations. RCA provides legitimacy in terms of indigenous participation, and has among other things developed best practices for FPIC that have been adopted by many governmental institutions.

- ✓ **In terms of financial sustainability, the programme is highly reliant on funding from RFN, and there is no overall exit strategy.** This poses a certain risk for the programme, not the least if new policies are introduced by the new government to undermine funding of advocacy actions pertaining to demarcation processes. However, there are few practical alternatives at hand, and the impressive results from the programme is largely due to the long-term commitment and partnership between RFN and its Brazilian partners.
- ✓ **There is no indication that the use of funds at project level was inefficient.** However, budget utilisation in 2017 was only at 76%. In 2016, budget utilisation of the Brazil programme was reported at 100.3%. It is not clear if favourable exchange rates are the sole reason why there was such a large sum unutilised funds in 2017. Both RCA and ISA spent the entire allocated budgets in local currency (BRL) in 2017.
- ✓ **Resources seem to have been used optimally.** There is no indication that resources were not optimally used. An organisational review undertaken by Norad in 2016 showed that 87% of RFN's funding is transferred to partner organisations and only 6% is spent on project management by RFN. Salary level by partners is generally considered in line with general salary levels in Brazil, although ISA operates with somewhat higher salaries than RCA. The targets for outputs have generally been reached and also surpassed in several instances, in particular pertaining to capacity building.
- ✓ **The approach by ISA and RCA is comprehensive, and beneficiaries generally appreciated the assistance provided.** ISA represents the professional "indigenista" expertise, whereas RCA has legitimacy by representing a majority of indigenous associations (10 out of 12). The strength of the approach is that project activities were designed based on actual needs identified by indigenous communities, in collaboration with a professional analysis to design a programme and capacity building to deal with these issues.
- ✓ **Despite many impressive achievements, the programme does not get a full score as progress is based on the defined results framework.** The results framework does not capture all potential outcomes of the programme, the link between outputs and outcomes is weak and the current two NICFI outcomes are not something that RFN can be directly hold accountable for. Although it is mandatory to include these outcomes, additional outcomes could also have been included.

## Key recommendations

- ✓ **RFN should carefully revisit the results framework, and try to formulate outcomes/outputs that more clearly depicts the actual achievements of the programme.** This is important not only to improve reporting and make achievements more visible, but also to be fully compliant with Norad's grant scheme rules which clearly states that annual reports shall report on outcome effects achieved for target groups. In particular impact of capacity building on community level and female participation/empowerment, is currently not sufficiently captured by the current results framework.
- ✓ **RFN should consider to what extent sustainability can be further enhanced.** As mentioned, the issue of sustainability is somewhat a paradox, and there may not be any easy available solution. There are however a certain risk associated with the changing political climate in Brazil, and RFN and partners should consider a contingency plan for possible political scenarios that could have a negative impact on sustainability.
- ✓ **RFN should consider if there is a need to reconcile financial reporting to ensure that all figures are correctly reported, and budgeting is correct.** Unutilised funds in 2017 were as much as 24%, and it seems this must be due to other reasons than a favourable exchange rate only. There has also been some minor confusion discovered by RFN in how partners (notably, RCA) reports and differentiates between Norad funding and NICFI funding. This has been clarified, but may be an indication on the need for further harmonising reporting between the two programs

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<sup>13</sup> Comitê Orientador do Fundo Amazônia - COFA

## 6.1.4 Effectiveness

Satisfactory: 5.0 out of 6.

**The Brazil programme is clearly in line with Norwegian priorities**, and has adopted the planned outcomes of the overall NICFI funding to civil society, as well as the mandatory common indicators of Norad, intended for enabling aggregation and summative reporting at grant scheme level. In Norad's NICFI Results report<sup>14</sup> (2013-2015), many of the RFN's achievements were highlighted, clearly depicting an alignment with Norwegian priorities.

**RFN has reached targets on most output indicators, and some progress on outcome indicators.** For instance, underneath outcome 2 (*Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities enjoy greater respect for their land rights and are recognized for their sustainable management and protection of the rainforest*), RFN reported a progress from Level 3 in 2015 to Level 4 in 2016. Brazil has also performed beyond targets for output indicators, something that has led RFN to set even higher targets for some of the outputs. One such example is the training of indigenous leaders (output 2.4), where target was set at 40 indigenous leaders trained by 2020. However, already in 2016, 23 persons had been trained, with another 23 being trained in 2017. The multiplication of this training in which indigenous trainers are training their own communities and associations, is not included and/or measured.

**In terms of the qualitative impact of RFN's partners, it is hard to measure to what extent policy advocacy actions *de-facto* can be attributed to civil society**, or whether other factors were more instrumental. Still, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence from several sources that both RCA and ISA has had a tremendous importance in the design and set-up of REDD+ and related policies in Brazil. As an example, ISA was instrumental in the early discussions concerning the creation of the Amazon Fund, and several sources claim that the Fund was a direct follow-up of ISA's successful advocacy a decade ago. Later, ISA has been part of the Amazon Fund Guidance Committee (COFA<sup>15</sup>), and has provided important inputs in many regards. Some of the more noteworthy inputs were:

- ✓ To cater for support to indigenous associations, and ensuring that such associations would have specific guidelines.
- ✓ To ensure that NGOs would not have to compete for funding in calls versus private sector entities.
- ✓ Ensure that FUNAI got a representative in the council of the fund (as FUNAI is underneath Minister of Justice, the agency was not represented to begin with).
- ✓ To ensure that the definition of "monitoring" did not exclude indigenous monitoring of the forest.

According to interviewees, all of these inputs originated from ISA, but was also adopted by other civil society organisations and led to inclusion of new procedures from BNDES. A main challenge has been to not only establish the Fund, but to ensure that funds also are made available to local indigenous communities and associations, many of whom have weak managerial capacity. As of today, only two projects have been awarded to indigenous associations by the Amazon Fund.

**Despite many impressive achievements, the programme does not get a full score as progress is based on the defined results framework.** Despite the fact that NICFI outcomes are mandatory, it is also possible to include other outcomes defined by the applicant. As defined by the grant-scheme rules: "Whenever possible, annual reports shall also report on effects achieved for the target groups (outcome(s))."<sup>16</sup>

In this case, the results framework do not fully encompass all achievements made by RFN and partners. Instead, there is a substantial gap between achievements on output level vs. outcome level, and there are many potential outcomes that are not covered by the current results framework. For instance, enabling indigenous leaders on climate change issues has an important outcome effect in terms of multiplication of knowledge in indigenous communities, and the ability for indigenous communities to master a climate change political discourse with potential real impacts on their local communities (in terms of grants, visibility,

<sup>14</sup> See: <https://www.norad.no/contentassets/05152b063fb0432ea65a729f643e1127/the-norwegian-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society—key-results-2013–2015.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Comitê Orientador do Fundo Amazônia - COFA

<sup>16</sup> See: <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/regelverk-for-norads-tilskuddsordninger/rules-for-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society-english.pdf>

access to services, etc.). And despite an impressive effort on inclusion of female indigenous leaders, this is hardly captured by any of the current programme outcomes. Hence, not achieving a full score in this assessment is mainly due to the fact that the results framework does not sufficiently capture the actual achievements of the programme.

### 6.1.5 Sustainability

**Moderately satisfactory: 4.3 out of 6.**

Sustainability is here understood as sustainable outcomes of the programme, as well as the (financial) sustainability of the partners.

**The main reason why the Brazil programme has performed so well, is that it builds on a 20+ year's partnership between RFN, ISA and RCA (and members).** This means that activities and targets are based on a long history, and the position of ISA and RCA in undertaking advocacy actions towards the government is obviously, not established over the span of two years. There is a continuity in the programme, which is highly positive and enables the programme to be highly cost-efficient and effective.

**The programme gets a top score for gender sensitive approach,** and a lesser degree of link between policies and realities on the ground. The main reason for this is that although a lot of the REDD+ policies are likely to have an impact in the longer term, there is not much immediate impact on the ground (apart from funding mechanism such as the Amazon Fund and REDD Early Movers – REM). There are other impressive outcomes from the programme, however, as already mentioned, these are not sufficiently captured by the results framework. Still, there is no doubt that policy design and capacity building may have a lasting and sustainable impact on the ground.

**In terms of financial sustainability of the partners, the programme scores moderately** due to the fact that the partners are highly dependent of RFN's contribution and there is no overall exit strategy. In 2017, ISA received some 13% of its total budget from RFN, whereas RCA is 100% funded by RFN. On the one hand, this enables ISA and RCA to concentrate precious time and resources on work vs. fundraising and reporting to donors. On the other hand, it also entails a greater extent of dependency on RFN – which poses a certain risk. One of the leading presidential candidates in the upcoming election (Mr Jair Bolsonaro, PSC-RJ) has publically stated that he will end all funding to NGOs, as well as to end all demarcation processes of indigenous territories and expel foreign NGOs.<sup>17</sup> Such measures constitute a high risk for ISA and RCA - as well as other civil society actors. Hence, sustainability poses a bit of a paradox, as the impressive results from the programme is entirely due to a long-term commitment and partnership between Brazilian partners and RFN. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the financial dependency to RFN poses a risk, albeit one with few practical alternatives at hand.

### 6.1.6 Relevance

**Satisfactory: 5.0 out of 6.**

**The programme is considered highly relevant to local beneficiaries,** and there is no doubt that RFN is working with the right partners to achieve results. There are a number of NGOs that work in related areas, but ISA is undoubtedly the leading NGO in Brazil when it comes to socio-environment, with a strong presence in the field and high competence in terms of advocacy and following the political development. Many joint NGO campaigns and initiatives have come to be as a result of ISA. RCA, on the other hand, has a strong mandate and legitimacy in terms its members (10 out of 12 member associations are indigenous), and has among other things been instrumental in developing FPIC best practices. There is no doubt that these two institutions are well suited to deliver on the programme objectives.

**The trainings provided by the programme are high in demand among the participants** both because it gives them important knowledge of political processes and climate change, but also because bringing indigenous leaders together is important for joint campaigns and empowerment. Adding to this, the participants bring this knowledge back to their communities where the knowledge is shared, thereby having a multiplying effect.

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<sup>17</sup> See for instance: <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nao-podemos-abrir-as-portas-para-todo-mundo-diz-bolsonaro-em-palestra-na-hebraica,70001725522>

As has been confirmed by several sources, the political discourse on "indigenous rights" has somewhat lost momentum in Brazil. Demarcation processes have slowed down, and there is an ongoing public debate to what extent indigenous peoples' claims for land should be acknowledged or not. At the same time, the government has clearly recognised the link between demarcation of indigenous lands and protection of forests, and the potential positive climate impact from this. In fact, demarcation is recognised by the government as one important element of a national REDD + strategy, and there is a clear intent to seek synergies between the implementation of the National Policy on Climate Change (PNMC) and the National Policy on Environmental Management in Indigenous Lands (PNGATI).<sup>18</sup> In interviews, several governmental officials desired even more collaboration with civil society in holding workshops and trainings for indigenous leaders, and to further engage the indigenous populations in discussions related to REDD+.

**Hence, it is important for indigenous peoples to master the political discourse of climate change**, in order to be able to advocate for preservation and demarcation. Strengthening indigenous leaders' presence in advocacy in political debate is important, not the least considering the increasing pressure through threats and violence committed towards indigenous leaders. The programme is clearly a positive contribution to this, and provides important support to marginalised peoples.

As already mentioned, many of the positive outcomes of the programme is not captured by the current results framework. Hence, the programme gets a low score on the link between outputs and outcomes. Despite the mandatory indicators and outcomes/outputs RFN has to include, there is still room for defining outcomes/outputs that more clearly depicts the actual achievements of the programme.

### 6.1.7 Efficiency

Highly satisfactory: 5.8 out of 6.

**There is no indication that the use of funds at project level was inefficient, however, there may be a need for reconciliation of figures.** The budget utilised by RFN is activity based, and a total of 28% (NOK 1,353,065) of actual expenditures in 2017 was for travel and other activity-related expenses, whereas 27% (NOK 1,353,065) were for salaries. Overhead and management costs by partners constitute 11% (NOK 556,568) whereas overhead and technical follow up from RFN constitute 10% (NOK 492,116). In 2016, budget utilisation of the Brazil programme was reported at 100.3%. But in 2017, only NOK 3.7 million out of NOK 4.9 million was spent, resulting in a budget utilization rate of 76%. According to the narrative report, the allocated budgets in local currency (BRL) were fully spent in 2017, but due to a combination of 1) favourable exchange rates and 2) rolled over funds from 2016, there was a larger sum unspent. As budget utilisation for Brazil was above 100% in 2016, it seems there must be other reasons for such a large underutilisation in 2017.

**Resources seem to have been used optimally.** There is no indication that resources were not optimally used. An organisational review undertaken by Norad in 2016 showed that 87% of RFN's funding is transferred to partner organisations and only 6% is spent on project management by RFN. Salary level by partners is generally considered in line with general salary levels in Brazil, although ISA operates with somewhat higher salaries than RCA. The targets for outputs have generally been reached and also surpassed in several instances, in particular pertaining to capacity building.

**The overall approach, methodology and work plan for the project were appreciated by the stakeholders.** Most activities underneath the project consist of monitoring of policies, participation in public debate and advocacy work (formulating proposals, papers, etc.). In addition, ISA and RCA has planned and – till now – held arranged two annual training modules for indigenous leaders (one in 2016, two in 2017 and one in 2018 – so far). Hence, most of the budget consist of 1) personnel costs, 2) travel and 3) capacity building (meetings and training modules).

**The approach by ISA and RCA is comprehensive, and beneficiaries generally appreciated the assistance provided.** The division between "indigenista" NGOs acting on behalf of indigenous populations, vs. "indigena" NGOs that consist of indigenous peoples acting on their own behalf, is a key distinction among local NGOs. The programme has a good balance between these two, as ISA represents the professional "indigenista" expertise, whereas RCA has legitimacy by representing a majority of indigenous associations (10 out of 12). The strength of the approach is that project activities were designed based on actual needs identified by indigenous communities, in collaboration with a professional analysis to design a

<sup>18</sup> Ministry of Environment (2013): *Conjunto de premissas para implementação de REDD+ em Terras Indígenas*  
<http://redd.mma.gov.br/images/central-de-midia/pdf/artigos/enredd-componenteindigena.pdf>

programme and capacity building to deal with these issues. Whereas ISA and the RCA secretariat can provide professional analysis and assessments, the RCA members and political council provides legitimacy – something highly appreciated by both indigenous leaders as well as governmental agencies.

**In general, the project was implemented on time.** There was reported a delay in implementing activities under 2.5 (territorial documentation), which were postponed till 2018. However, although targets on most output indicators have been reached, progress on outcome level is still slow. This is mostly related to the fact that impact of the programme is likely beyond what is captured by the results framework (further elaborated below).

### 6.1.8 Impact

Satisfactory: 5.3 out of 6.

**As previously mentioned, the impact of the programme is likely beyond what is captured by the results framework and the outcomes utilised.** However, progress on the defined outcomes, of which RFN cannot be held to account, is not much. A risk is that change of government will have a severe impact on current politics related to REDD+ and indigenous peoples, resulting in a setback in terms of attaining the outcome and corresponding indicators.

**Having said that, the programme is performing well beyond most output targets,** and have clearly demonstrated that programme activities have contributed to the recognition of the role of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities in protecting the rainforest. As an example, ISA is working with indigenous associations and communities in Xingu to restore forests outside the park, utilising native seeds from the reserve. Funds from this is not directly coming from NICFI/Norad, however, indigenous leaders from Xingu have participated in trainings underneath the climate programme, which has been important in understanding climate change and knowledge on how to access funds for such projects. According to the Amazon Environmental research Institute (IPAM), the Xingu Park is vital to preserve current levels of rainfalls and temperature, and should the reserve be deforested it is likely to reduce current rainfalls by 50%. Having such knowledge is important both in terms of indigenous leaders being able to advocate for demarcation of territories, but also in terms of the public acknowledging indigenous populations as guardians of the forests.

**The programme maintains a flexible approach** and has been able to respond effectively to current political issues. There are no apparent negative effects from the programme, however, there might be potential to further investigate collaboration with governmental agencies (in particular Ministry of Environment and Foreign Relations) linked to further include indigenous populations in public dialogue on climate change.

## 6.2 Annex 2: Case Study Indonesia

### 6.2.1 Project description

Indonesia is one of the largest tropical forested countries that has made a progressive move to acknowledge the rights of indigenous communities, supported by a mixture of national and international programmes. Although Indonesia's REDD+ agency was dismissed in 2014, the country has a strong ambition to implement social forestry programmes which can provide a strong basis for REDD+ implementations in Indonesia; however programmes and actions do not fully match with the country's strong ambition. The social forestry programme, combined with agrarian reform, allows Adat and forest-dependent peoples to obtain their land rights and access government social development programmes including services such as electricity, education and health care. The process is deemed very slow especially for Adat forest scheme. Rights to clearly-bounded land and the capacity to manage such land are key in preparing Indonesian communities to live sustainably with the rainforests surrounding their villages, and to implement REDD+.

In Indonesia, the RFN programme aims to build the capacity of some civil society at the grassroots and national level. The programme aims to empower Adat and forest-dependent communities to gain their land rights, while at the same time helping the government to accelerate the implementation of its relevant programmes. The RFN programme in Indonesia has two main target groups:

1. **Policymakers** with the power to influence district, regency, provincial, ministerial and national policy; and
2. **Adat and forest-dependent communities**, including Adat women, who need to be prepared to access their rights to land and other rights such as basic infrastructure, education and health care, through an administrative process.

The 2015 forest fires created momentum for the President to strengthen the country's commitment to rehabilitating peatland and continuously strengthening multi-stakeholder efforts towards fire prevention, involving the military and police forces. With greater attention to prevent forest fires as well as wet conditions, the deforestation rate decreased significantly in 2016 and 2017. The 2018 is relatively dry and the 2019 is going to be a dry year hence these two years will become the testing period whether the government intervention to combat forest fires is effective. The commitment to agrarian reform has been reaffirmed with a series of national moratoriums on forest concessions since 2015, and in September 2018 the President imposed a three-year moratorium on palm-oil concessions.

### 6.2.2 Overall programme rating

The programme is rated satisfactory (4.3 out of 6)

**The RFN programme in Indonesia is highly relevant and timely, and is aligned with the government's priority agenda.** The programme benefits from the strong commitment of the government to address its land tenure issues and reduce conflicts emerging between communities, concession holders and the government itself, such as problems with encroachment on national parks and protected forest areas. This coincides with a strong government focus on development with a pro-poor and pro-marginalized-people focus. A village fund programme aims to enhance economic development for people living in villages and remote territories. At the same time, the RFN programme is strengthening the capacity of civil society by supporting the establishment of NGOs at a time when the government is open to working with civil society organisations to achieve government programmes where the geographical locations for their implementation are fairly remote and difficult to reach.

**The Indonesian government values the contribution of RFN partners highly.** During the UNFCCC negotiations in Paris and Marrakech the government uses cases of village forests promoted and supported by RFN as examples of successful REDD+ sites. The national government highly appreciates village forest proposals prepared by KKI Warsi and communities, especially those in Jambi and West Sumatra Province, which support the government in achieving its programme target. At province level, KKI Warsi informs and respects Jambi provincial government by providing updates on social forestry proposals to be submitted to the national government. This reduces the risk of conflict due to lack of coordination. At regency level, KKI Warsi engages regency government agencies in collaborating on and actively participating in building the capacity of communities that KKI Warsi is supporting. When KKI Warsi is phasing out of a development strategy it uses this as one of its exit strategies, leaving the government to continue the community

development. At the village level, KKI Warsi consults villagers on suitable types of social forestry scheme and approaches to community development, so that the proposed activities meet their needs and can be fully accepted by all members.

**The RFN programme in Indonesia responds well to Indonesia’s political dynamics while maintaining its alignment with the strategic objectives of RFN and the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative.**

RFN partners maintain their engagement with government leaders across all levels and closely engage with the key champions, despite changes in political leadership in regency and provincial levels. In 2018-2019 there is a moderate risk that the presidential election will slow some RFN activities. Nonetheless the social forestry agenda is arguably stable, and will continue regardless of who is elected President. RFN partners and other NGOs have a critical role in promoting sustainable landscape management and the sustainability of existing government programmes through a series of dialogues with presidential candidates.




Figure 8: Indonesia programme rating summary

**6.2.3 Lessons learned and key recommendations**

RFN has the opportunity to amplify its impacts through collaboration with other Norwegian projects, and to improve the capacity of its partners by sharing its global campaign and advocacy strategy. The RFN can share its success stories with its partners in Indonesia and at the same time align its advocacy message across global and national levels as well as with the government’s agenda by linking forest protection and economic development. The RFN can keep being flexible in its financial resource management and support projects with high risk and high gain, but with a better financial safeguards. This can be achieved by conducting trainings for trainers to improve the *financial management capacity and fundraising strategy* of NGOs, government units such as forest management units, cooperatives, and grass-root communities. This capacity-building effort will provide a strong basis for the sustainability of these institutions, i.e. by improving their access to finance, and their fundraising strategies. This can be supported by RFN’s presence in Indonesia. This RFN presence will also allow RFN to develop a regular communications meeting with embassy-funded programmes to improve synergy and collaboration.

With its abundance of experience and achievements, KKI Warsi has the potential to scale up its efforts and to support RFN’s work in Papua via an arrangement tailored to the local Papuan needs and context. One potential strategy for entering new geographical areas is by strengthening alliances and networks. These networks can be used as a resource to build local ownership and a development road map for capacity-building for local people and NGOs in new intervention locations. For this, KKI Warsi needs medium- to long-term commitment from RFN or other donors with similar objectives to ensure a smooth transition and

the building of a long term plan with clear milestones and a solid foundation from which locally-hired people will deliver the implementation. In the intervention locations where the communities' development has been significantly improved, KKI Warsi can support the local government with the creation of roadmaps and action plans and with community monitoring and communication strategies, so that coordination between communities and the government is set for the continuation of KKI Warsi activities. KKI Warsi also can build strategic partnerships with social business experts such as NTFP-EP, who can provide support with the development of community product marketing and supply chains.

Responding to the rapid expansion of its membership, it is time for Perempuan AMAN to review its strategic plan, including its communication and influencing strategy, together with RFN. The risk of overburdening and burning out is high in newly-established institutions, especially when continuous expansion is not followed by structural adjustment. Perempuan AMAN has taken the right measures to build a strong foundation for its financial administration and management; however, there is also a need to review its structure as a wing organisation, its connectivity with AMAN, and its role within AMAN and Perempuan AMAN's reporting mechanism, to ensure that the leadership of Perempuan AMAN is able to carry its role as the representative face of the organisation to external stakeholders. One of Perempuan AMAN's strategic agendas can be to focus more on building cohesion with local AMAN chapters and RFN partners at the grass roots as the primary focus of the gender mainstreaming effort.

Madani's role in convening stakeholders at the national level has the potential to promote national and sub-national coordination among NGOs, the government, and private companies. This role is well-regarded by many NGOs and arguably fills the coordination gap, especially among NGOs. With the Indonesian government's openness to working with NGOs, and the increasing number of private companies that need NGO support to fulfil their zero deforestation commitment, Madani has the opportunity to engage with various stakeholders and put forward solutions and options for the government actions including criticisms. This can be organised according to themes proposed by the stakeholders, and discussions can be carried out both physically and virtually. Madani also has the potential to educate and initiate the discussion about the forest protection agenda with the presidential candidates. With the establishment of the environment fund (BLU), Madani can convene NGOs to ask the government for a consultation on access to the BLU and clarification on the role of NGOs in BLU decision-making.

#### 6.2.4 Effectiveness

Moderately satisfactory: 4.3 out of 6

**The Indonesia programme is aligned with Norwegian priorities as well as Indonesia's national programmes.** As previously mentioned, Indonesia's social forestry programme and agrarian reform promote a strong basis for REDD+ implementation. The land rights of Adat peoples and other forest-dependent communities have been acknowledged in some places in Indonesia, although the benefits of this have not been made widely known or utilised, and the process has been arguably slow and the target over-ambitious hence tend to be revised/reduced.

The RFN programme in Indonesia has reached its targets on most output indicators, while the outcome indicators are underway slowly. Indonesia has enacted three policies targeted by the RFN programme, namely the NDC, which focuses on the land sector, a financing mechanism for environment finance including for REDD+. This mechanism was enacted in September 2018 through Presidential Regulation Number 77 Year 2018 but has not yet been operationalized and there is an opportunity for RFN partners with the NGOs supported by the Embassy of Norway to provide input for its institutional set up such as consultation procedures and criteria of financing; and the last is a moratorium policy on new palm oil concessions enacted through Presidential Decree Number 8 Year 2018. This new moratorium is valid for three years and beginning in September 2018.

**RFN Partners in Indonesia contribute to international policymaking by providing case studies on grass-root developments, but still on the early stage to provide input for national policymaking.** The RFN programme in Indonesia's contribution to UNFCCC negotiations is largely made through national partners' involvement in discussions with Indonesian negotiators. The RFN also supports the representation of its partners at COP negotiations. So far RFN partners have been less involved in GCF meetings and other international forums such as the FCPF due to lack of support from these funding institutions in Indonesia.

The attribution of impact achievements to RFN partners and other NGOs working in Indonesia on similar issues is based on geographical location during a certain period. Programme activities in Indonesia

contribute to the adaptation of policies for the protection of land rights, and access to government programmes such as education and social health care for indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, mainly in Jambi Province and North Kalimantan, through social forestry schemes initiated by the government. The activities of one of the RFN partners in Indonesia, KKI Warsi, also contribute to the protection of the natural ecosystem through the promotion of environmentally-friendly tourism, which is expected to provide a significant number of jobs and improve the livelihoods of young people (male and female).

The overall programme has been able to respond to unexpected challenges constraining attainment of its objectives by carefully diverting resources. This comes with a consequence that this reduces the number of partners and a strategic intervention location such as in Papua. The mismanagement of partners of RFN was handled by RFN by following the protocol and terminating the partnerships. The funding was diverted and allocated to a well-performing partner (KKI Warsi) so that the programme's presence in Kalimantan can continue to be maintained, but the programme's presence in Papua is cancelled. This creates an opportunity for KKI Warsi to stretch beyond its comfort zone and conduct activities outside of its main working areas in Sumatra but still this does not cover the original scope of the programme.

### 6.2.5 Sustainability

**Moderately satisfactory: 4.3 out of 6**

Facilitation by an RFN partner is helping to create a link between policies and their implementation on the ground, while wider law enforcement on illegal logging involving rent-seekers tends to be continuously violated or ignored. Policies related to the social forestry scheme are implemented with strong support from NGOs such as RFN partners (KKI Warsi, Perempuan AMAN) and other donor programmes. However, due to limited government HR and budget, for now such implementation is only in the early stages, and it is unlikely to be sustainable without the support of the NGOs working on the ground. Law enforcement against illegal logging is still very weak due to police and military forces' rent-seeking behaviour.

A gender-sensitive approach has been assured for both recipients and local beneficiaries by empowering women's groups in villages using a method tailored to the groups' habits and behaviour. Women have been educated and empowered via gender-sensitive facilitation, including facilitator-led discussion during some women's group activities in the village, where consensus-building among women was initiated. The women were then encouraged to channel their voices at village meetings. There is room for more collaboration among RFN partners in Indonesia, such as KKI Warsi and Perempuan AMAN, to work on the ground.

While there is a programme awareness of the need for RFN partners to ensure sustainability, no strategy for exiting a community engagement has been explicitly written. KKI Warsi ensures that community capacity-building is sustainable, making communities more independent, able to run their own villages, and understanding their rights and responsibilities. This has been demonstrated at the KKI Warsi site (Bujang Raba) in Jambi Province. However, no exit strategy with clear criteria has been explicitly written.

**A clear transition and exit strategy will include the transference of the development role**, in mature intervention areas where the role of the RFN partner is less relevant, to a more suitable organisation such as those that develop social entrepreneurship for communities, and organisations focusing on developing supply chains for niche community products.

**A scaling-up strategy is critical for wider impact and to improve RFN partners' outreach**; to initiate the development of an expansion and scaling-up plan and strategy to areas with characteristics similar to those in areas where RFN partners have been successful on the ground; to support the development of a roadmap for provincial government which includes the provincial government's capacity-building and training programme; and to include areas where RFN partners are gradually leaving and whose facilitation needs to be continued by provincial government.

### 6.2.6 Relevance

**Moderately satisfactory: 4.6 out of 6**

The project concept is well-designed and realistic, and there is an opportunity to build a stronger synergy among partners within the programme and other Norway-funded programmes. Each partner has a well-designed project whose role of each project responds relevantly to the need at national and grassroots levels and overlooked thematic areas, i.e. gender. However, the connection between partners in this

programme is built on informal discussion and an annual formal RFN partner meeting, and there is a lack of formal interlinkage between partners via a national theory of change that shows the role of each partner in the REDD+ programme.

Programme activities regarded as highly relevant by local beneficiaries, and their formal access to land, facilitate their access to other government social programmes. The communities whose land rights have been acknowledged with the support of KKI Warsi claim that they receive support from the government (such as with accessing village funds, machinery, and production equipment) and other donors (such as for a micro hydro project). Formal recognition of land rights comes with other rights to access government social programmes; however, these are often not recognised or utilised without the help and support of NGOs on the ground.

**There are links between outputs and outcomes, although the connection is not explicit and needs to be clarified.** There is a need to assess the assumption of causal links from output to outcome and from outcome to impact more deeply. The results hierarchy shows that Outcome 1 focuses on international policymaking and Outcome 2 on national policy development, without a clear connection between the two. A workshop to review the causal links between each output and outcome with partners can be used to improve the programme communication strategy on how the programme will deliver its outcomes. This can be included in a monitoring and evaluation cycle of Indonesia programme. There is more work to be done at Indonesia's grass-root and reGENCY levels; national work has been started and RFN can work more at this level with stories and good examples from the ground to influence national policy.

**RFN's activities in Indonesia are relevant to the overall programme objectives and are being implemented by the right partners.** RFN has been working with KKI Warsi, which has abundant experience, a good track record of partnership with RFN, and a similar vision and mission. This has been a strong partnership since the 2000s. This success story should be well documented and communicated well to targeted audience including donors, the private sector (i.e. investors) and the general public.

**Some indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities have benefited from the project.** The land rights of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities are acknowledged by the states in which they are located, and the project done KKI Warsi supports the legal process for the communities to reach a consensus by all village members through participatory mapping. The project also complements the activities by building the capacity of the village on harvesting coffee through targeted harvesting techniques (only picking the mature coffees which later can be sold at the premium price). This approach brings communities more added value and sustainable income.

**Partner NGOs have benefited from the project, and their human resources and financial management have improved, but they still have high financial dependency.** More people from NGOs now have experience of supporting international negotiations. The project has increased the HR capacity of newly-developed NGOs such as Perempuan AMAN and Madani to deliver results, and has improved the financial capacity of Perempuan AMAN. These partners need further support to improve their fundraising strategy so that they are not relying solely on RFN.

**The indicators and/or outcomes/outputs are comprehensive, but forest-dependent people's sustainable income, livelihoods, and access to education should be considered under the programme to ensure sustainability.** These are aspects that are not shown in the log frame but are strongly linked to the RFN project on the ground, and hence should be considered.

## 6.2.7 Efficiency

**Moderately satisfactory: 4.3 out of 6**

**RFN project activities in Indonesia are carried out in a cost-efficient manner.** Between 2016 and September 2018, KKI Warsi spent approximately 8.32 NOK for 200,000 HA facilitated for CBFM (20 villages) and supported the recognition of 50 villages through the social forestry programme.

The allocation of available resources, namely human resources and finance, has been optimal to support activities on the ground. KKI Warsi and Perempuan AMAN have allocated a significant number of people to on-the-ground activities with communities, so there is more progress at the village level, while Madani fills the gap at the national level, coordinating stakeholders' focus on key policy issues. The majority of financial resources for this programme are allocated to KKI Warsi, which has a good reputation and is the oldest

RFN partner in Indonesia. Warsi and Madani have the capacity to jointly develop more communication work to initiate policy discussion in provinces on which KKI Warsi plans to focus.

The implementation of Indonesia's programme is on track, i.e. it has been timely and followed the planned pathway, but follow-up and strategies for improving the quality of targeted policies are required. Almost all of the targeted policies have been implemented, although a few, such as Adat Community Law, are non-existent due to a lack of interest of parliamentary members to discuss this sensitive topic. The majority of targeted policies are insufficient to cover the REDD+ principles. The implementation of KKI Warsi and Madani are on track, with delays to Perempuan AMAN due to its rapid expansion which needs to be balanced with structural adjustment.

The RFN's contribution to local partners goes beyond financial support, with opportunities for sharing success and knowledge transfer. The RFN is open to discussing challenges and issues in order to reach solutions with its partners to achieve the targets and accelerate the implementation of the programme. The RFN can further support partners' capacity-building by providing training on global advocacy and campaign reflecting the RFN's global success.

### 6.2.8 Impact

**Moderately satisfactory: 4.3 out of 6**

**The programme in Indonesia is likely to attain its impact indicators.** Most of the policies targeted by the RFN programme are in place. However, there is still a quality issue. This needs to be addressed, since many targeted policies are insufficient to include the rights of Adat and forest dependent peoples, which this programme aims for. There is a need for RFN partners, the boundary partners of RFN partners and the RFN itself to develop strategies to specifically address this issue.

In Indonesia, the contribution of RFN programme activities towards recognition of the role of indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities in protecting the rainforest is significant in some locations in Jambi and West Sumatra. The programme has contributed to this end, in particular in Jambi and West Sumatra Province, through the work of KKI Warsi. The work of Perempuan AMAN has just begun, and it has the potential to improve the recognition of women's rights in the development of relevant policy.

**The programme adequately addresses any unexpected negative side effects.** It has been able to allocate funding previously allocated to Walhi Kalteng, preventing its financial mismanagement and following this with a plan to strengthen the financial management of existing RFN partners in Indonesia, including an evaluation to ensure the sustainability of partnerships.

## 6.3 Annex 3: List of Key Documents

### Global

- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway strategy 2018-2030
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's gender policy
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's human rights policy
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's partner policy
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's Anti-Corruption Policy
- ✓ Detailed NICFI 2016 and 2017 Financial Reports
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway Norad/NICFI funding application (2016-2020)
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's narrative and financial report 2016
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's narrative and financial report 2017
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's financial report 2018 (till 20<sup>th</sup> August)
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway's "Baseline and expected results for "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the rainforest"
- ✓ Rainforest Foundation Norway miscellaneous reports (travel reports, country specific reports, etc)
- ✓ Grant Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and Rainforest Foundation Norway regarding QZA-16/0190 Rights-Based REDD+: Indigenous Peoples as Guardians of the Rainforest
- ✓ Norad Grant Scheme rules for Climate and Forest funding to Civil Society
- ✓ Norad menu of Common Indicators
- ✓ Norad management review of Caritas Norway, Lions Aid Norway, Rainforest Foundation Norway and the Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund (2016)
- ✓ Werf, Morton, DeFries, Olivier, Kasibhatla, Jackson, Collatz and Randerson (2009): CO2 emissions from forest loss". Nature Geoscience. 2 (11): 737–738

### Indonesia

- ✓ Presidential Regulation Number 77 Year 2018 on Management of Environment Finance
- ✓ Presidential Regulation Number 86 Year 2018 on Agrarian Reform
- ✓ Presidential Instruction Number xx Year 2018 Oil palm moratorium
- ✓ 2016-2020 Multi-year application form filled in by KKI Warsi
- ✓ 2016, 2017 final report by KKI Warsi
- ✓ 2018-2020 Multi-year application form filled in by Madani
- ✓ 2017 final report by Madani
- ✓ 2018 Mid year report by Madani
- ✓ 2016 Multi-year application form filled in by Perempuan AMAN
- ✓ 2016 Annual report by Perempuan AMAN
- ✓ 2017 final report by Perempuan AMAN
- ✓ 2016-2020 budget by KKI Warsi
- ✓ 2017 financial report by KKI Warsi
- ✓ 2017 financial report by Madani
- ✓ 2018 budget report by Madani and Perempuan AMAN
- ✓ Gender Baseline Study Programme Klima 5 RFN Partners in Indonesia (HuMa, Women's Solidarity, Walhi Kalteng, Warsi, Red and White Foundation)
- ✓ Gender Baseline Study III: Preliminary Study of Gender Awareness Levels and Integration of Gender Perspectives in Institutional Six Partners of Rainforest Foundation Norway in Indonesia
- ✓ A report: Integrating Gender Perspectives in Forest Management and Natural Resources in Indonesia
- ✓ RFN's Gender Activities in Indonesia: A summary (draft)

### Myanmar

- ✓ 2017 final report by POINT (Promotion of Indigenous and Nature Together)
- ✓ 2017 financial report by POINT
- ✓ 2017 Midyear financial report by POINT

- ✓ 2017 End of the year report by Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari
- ✓ 2017 Midyear financial report Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari

## DRC

- ✓ 2017 final report by Societe Civile Environnementale
- ✓ Narrative Report of the Project Supporting the Recognition of Land and Forestry Rights of Women at All Levels by Its Involvement in Deforestation Reduction Activities.
- ✓ 2018 Mid year report by CFLEDD
- ✓ Evaluation Report prior to the CFLEDD partnership with RFN
- ✓ CFLEDD summary report

## Brazil

- ✓ ISA semi-annual narrative and financial report 2016
- ✓ ISA annual work plan 2016
- ✓ ISA Budget 2016
- ✓ ISA application to RFN 2016-2021
- ✓ ISA semi-annual narrative and financial report 2017
- ✓ ISA annual work plan 2017
- ✓ ISA Budget 2017
- ✓ RCA semi-annual narrative and financial report 2016
- ✓ RCA annual work plan 2016
- ✓ RCA Budget 2016
- ✓ RCA application to RFN 2016-2021
- ✓ RCA semi-annual narrative and financial report 2017
- ✓ RCA annual work plan 2017
- ✓ RCA Budget 2017
- ✓ Input provided by RFN to the Amazon Fund (3)
- ✓ *Política Nacional de Gestão Territorial e Ambiental de Terras Indígenas – PNGATI*
- ✓ *Ministry of Environment (2013): Conjunto de premissas para implementação de REDD+ em Terras Indígenas*

## Web resources

- ✓ [doi:10.1038/ngeo671](https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo671)
- ✓ <https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/climate-change-and-environment/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-nicfi/norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/>
- ✓ <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/regelverk-for-norads-tilskuddsordninger/rules-for-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society-english.pdf>
- ✓ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>
- ✓ [https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/07/21/politica/1500589783\\_221019.html](https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/07/21/politica/1500589783_221019.html)
- ✓ <https://cimi.org.br/pub/Relatorio2016/relatorio2016.pdf>
- ✓ <http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticias/reuters/2018/09/03/bolsonaro-diz-que-pode-retirar-brasil-do-acordo-de-paris-se-for-eleito.htm>
- ✓ <https://www.norad.no/contentassets/05152b063fb0432ea65a729f643e1127/the-norwegian-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society---key-results-2013--2015.pdf>
- ✓ <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/regelverk-for-norads-tilskuddsordninger/rules-for-climate-and-forest-funding-to-civil-society-english.pdf>
- ✓ <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nao-podemos-abrir-as-portas-para-todo-mundo-diz-bolsonaro-em-palestra-na-hebraica,70001725522>
- ✓ <http://redd.mma.gov.br/images/central-de-midia/pdf/artigos/enredd-componenteindigena.pdf>

## 6.4 Annex 4: List of persons and institutions consulted

In Norway:

Institution	Date	Name of person	Position
Naturvernforbundet	28.09.2018	Dag Arne Høystad	Director, International Department
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Siri Blader	Programme Coordinator Colombia
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Siri Damman	Senior Adviser Myanmar
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Ines Luna Maira	Team Leader Brazil
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Madel Gunnarshaug Rosland	Team Leader DRC
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Gunnell Sandanger	Senior Adviser DRC
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Eigil Kvernmo	Programme Coordinator Peru
Rainforest Foundation	28.09.2018	Anders Haug Larsen	Team Leader Policy and Legal Framework

In Brazil:

Institution	Date	Name of person	Position
APINA	20.09.2018	Pauri waiapi	Representative of the Council of APINA, Indigenous association of the Wáiapí communities
APINA	20.09.2018	Jamy Waiapi	Representative of the Council of APINA, Indigenous association of the Wáiapí communities
ATIX	20.09.2018	Wareaiup y kaiabi	President of ATIX, Association of the Xingu Indigenous Territory
BNDES/Amazon Fund	26.09.2018	Juliana Santiago	Former Director, Department of Environment and Management of the Amazon Fund
BNDES/Amazon Fund	20.09.2018	Angela Albernaz Skaf	Administrator, Department of Environment and Management of the Amazon Fund
BNDES/Amazon Fund		Bernardo Braune	Lawyer, Legal Department
FOIRN (Rio Negro)	20.09.2018	Elizangela da Silva Costa	Coordinator of FOIRN Women's Department
FUNAI - CGGAM	21.09.2018	Nathali Germano dos Santos	Coordinator
Iequana (Yanomami)	20.09.2018	Edmilson Estevão Magalhães	Director of the Iequana Association
IPAM	21.09.2018	Paulo Moutinho	Senior Researcher
ISA	22.09.2018	Adriana Ramos	Programme Coordinator
Kampinas Katokina	20.09.2018	Edilson Katukina	President of the Agroforestry Agents Movement of Acre
Ministry of Environment	25.09.2018	Jair Schmitt	Director, Dep. Of Forests and Combat of Deforestation
Ministry of Environment	25.09.2018	Monique Sacardo Ferreira	Director, Secretary of Climate change and forests.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	24.09.2018	Luiz Andrade	MFA Climate Change Division
Norwegian Embassy	24.09.2018	Kristian Bengtson	Programme officer
Norwegian Embassy	24.09.2018	Eirik Sørli	Special Advisor
Norwegian Embassy	24.09.2018	Priscilla Santos	Programme officer
Observatório do Clima	24.09.2018	Carlos Rittl	Executive Secretary
Pankara/PNGATI Climate Change Technical Board	20.09.2018	Cícera Leal Cabral	Deputy Chief, member of the River Basin Committee of São Francisco and the PNGATI Climate Change Technical Board
RCA	21.09.2018	Patricia de Almeida Zuppi	Advisor - RCA Executive Secretary
Rio Oiapoque	20.09.2018	Priscila Barbosa De Freitas	Leader, Coordinator of the indigenous articulation of Rio Oiapoque

In Indonesia:

Institution	Date	Name of person	Position
Rainforest Foundation Norway	25.09.2018	Anja Lillgraven	Manager Asia and Oceania
Indonesia's Ministry of Environment and Forestry	25.09.2018	Erna Rodiana	Director of Social Forestry
Kalynamitra	25.09.2018	Rena Herdiani	Deputy leader for programmemeing
Madani berkelanjutan	25.09.2018	Anggalia Putri Permata Sari	Director of Forestry and Climate Change Programme, Knowledge Management Director
WRI Indonesia	25.09.2018	Nirarta	Country Director
Bappenas	26.09.2018	Pungky Sumadi, PhD	Director of Forestry and Conservation of Natural Resources
Kemitraan	26.09.2018	Hasbi Berlian	Programme manager
Indonesia's Ministry of Environment and Forestry	26.09.2018	Irhamyah	Director of Boundary Establishment
Presidential office	27.09.2018	Abetnego Tarigan	Senior Advisor
HUMA	27.09.2018	Dahniar Andriani	Executive coordinator
Komnas Perempuan (women violence commission)	27.09.2018	Dwi Kristina	Secretary
Tropical Forest alliance	27.09.2018	Erwin Widodo	Team leader for South East Asian region
Komnas HAM (human rights commission)	28.09. 2018	Sandra Moniaga	Deputy Director for External Relations
Indonesia's Ministry of Education	28.09.2018	Euis Yumirawati	Staff in Learning Division under research and development unit
Walhi (national secretariat)	28.09.2018	Oslan Purba	Department Head for programme development
Warsi	29.09.2018	Rudi Syaf, Emmy, Robert	Executive Director, REDD+ project coordinator, ACT coordinator
Air Terjun community	30.09.2018	Atmaja Juli	Village head and the communities
Forest management unit of Kerinci Regency	01.10.2018	Neneng Susanti	Head of forest management unit of Kerinci Regency
Bappeda Kerinci Regency	01.10. 2018	Agus Z. Sudirman	Head of Bappeda Kerinci Legislative member of Kerinci
Adat forest Serampas	02.10. 2018	Asan Apede, Akhir Ali (BPD), Emtanuin (Kadus), Sarudin (enterprise unit director), Ahmadi (head of Adat forest), Aminijas (coffee management lead), musterawendi (Head of microhydro)	Village community members and leader
Rainforest Foundation Norway	02.10. 2018	Neni Indriati	Programme coordinator
Warsi	02.10. 2018	Rudi Syaf, Emmy, Dai	Executive Director, REDD+ project coordinator,
Industry agency of Bungo Regency	03.10. 2018	Deddy	
Bappeda of Bungo Regency	03.10. 2018	Safrizal	Head of Bappeda
Community empowerment Agency of Bungo Regency	03.10. 2018	Iman	Deputy of community empowerment
Forestry Agency of Jambi Province	03.10. 2018	Gushendra	Sector head for community empowerment socialization and the capacity building of Adat forest
Perempuan AMAN	03.10. 2018	Devi Anggraini	Executive Director
Tropenbos Indonesia	04.10. 2018	Edy Purwanto	Executive Director
NTPF	04.10. 2018	Jusupta Tarigan	Executive Director
Norwegian Embassy for Indonesia	04.10. 2018	Christoffer Grønstad, Lisetta Trebbi, Nita Irawati Murjani	Counselor CSO engagement, Counselor climate and forest, Advisor for Forestry and Climate

Institution	Date	Name of person	Position
Ministry of Environment and Forestry	04.10. 2018	Nur Masripatin	Advisor to the Minister of Environment and Forestry
Greenpeace Indonesia	04.10. 2018	Kiki Taufik	Executive Director
Debtwatch	04.10. 2018	Arimbi Heroe Putri	
CIFOR	04.10. 2018	Cyntia Maharani	Senior Research Officer

## 6.5 Annex 5: Terms of Reference

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### External Mid-Term Review (MTR) of Rainforest Foundation Norway's programme "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the rainforest"

##### Background

Rainforest Foundation Norway's programme "Rights-based REDD+: Indigenous peoples as guardians of the rainforest" (hereby called the climate programme) is a five year programme funded by Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). The programme started in 2016 and ends after 2020. RFN implements the programme together with 18 partners, in seven different countries. The annual budget is about 25 million NOK. An external mid-term review (MTR) is scheduled for 2018.

The programme's expected outcomes are:

(i) The international climate regime for land-use and forests includes a rights-based approach and provisions to protect natural ecosystems.

(ii) Indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities enjoy greater respect for their land rights and are recognized for their sustainable management and protection of the rainforest.

##### Purpose of the mid-term review

1. Assess the overall progress towards the achievement of the programme outcomes as specified in the Programme Document.
2. Learn and improve the ongoing work for the remaining period of the programme.

##### Review questions

1. To what extent is RFN and partners implementation on track to achieving the programme's outcomes (effectiveness)?
2. Should RFN and partners do anything differently in the remainder of the programme period, to strengthen achievements towards the outcomes? Are there any gaps that we should address in order to achieve outcome targets?
3. Is there reason to re-consider the planned outcomes and outputs (relevance)?
4. What is RFN's added value to the partner (added value)? Should we do anything differently in order to strengthen the added value towards our partners?
5. What are the key lessons learned so far in the programme implementation (lessons learned)?
6. Has the programme been able to adapt to changing realities and opportunities for increased action?

##### The Scope of the evaluation

The MTR will cover the period from 2016 to the present. The consultant will propose the relevant scope with regard to partners, projects and locations, within the set budgetary limitations.

##### Methodology

The methodology shall be proposed by the consultant (s) and approved by RFN. The evaluation approach should be participatory to ensure learning for both RFN and partners.

The consultant will prepare an inception report that will outline the present proposed methodology. This report will be the first delivery of the consultancy.

The consultant will work closely with RFN and partners in setting up relevant interviews and meetings.

The consultant shall interview selected partners and actors that the programme seeks to address, such as government institutions, and include their reflections in the final report.

### **Key milestones and deliveries**

The consultant(s) will work closely with RF and partner designated staff. All deliverables will be submitted to RF team on date as mutually agreed during the inception meeting. The consultant should submit the following key deliverables.

**Inception report:** This should include amongst others, the proposed approach to data collection and analysis, including methods and a detailed plan with timeline to achieve the objectives stated above. It should include descriptions of data collection and analytical tools to be employed, how to solve any language issues and planned format for the report.

**Schedule of field visit and meetings:** This will be developed together with RFN and relevant partners, based on the inception report.

**Draft report:** This will include all the key elements of the final report, including a description of methodology, limitations and challenges faced, preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations.

**Presentation:** Before the final report is prepared, the consultant shall organize a presentation of selected elements of the draft report to RFN, and possibly to partners via Skype. The aim of this presentation is to receive feedback on findings and preliminary conclusions and recommendations.

**Final report:** The final report is to be submitted after feedback has been received and integrated into the draft report. The final report should be submitted as a final, proof-read version, in a reader-friendly layout, and submitted electronically. The report shall be in English and constitute a maximum of 30 pages, excluding annexes. It should contain at least the following sections (not exhaustive):

- Executive summary (max 2 pages);
- Introduction and context background;
- Description of the evaluation questions and methodology for data collection and analysis including scope, constraints, and limitations;
- Brief description of the projects evaluated;
- Findings and conclusions;
- Recommendations for the remainder of the programme and future programming to be implemented by RFN

Annexes to be included are: The agreed Terms of Reference (ToR), work plan, data collection instruments, reference to sources of information (including interviewees) for both qualitative and quantitative data.

The consultant shall organize a presentation of the final report with the programme funders in Norad.

#### **Timeline and budget**

The consultant will be expected to make her/his/their own arrangements for accommodation, travel and office facilities during the evaluation. RFN will assist with travel to partners in the project area.

The total budget, including travels, should not exceed NOK 350 000.

The consultancy is planned to be undertaken before December 2018. Proposed dates should be outlined in the proposal. Final dates will be agreed upon between consultants and RFN.

#### **Qualification and composition of the team:**

The MTR will be carried out by one or more consultants. The combined qualifications of the evaluation team shall as a minimum constitute least five years experience on evaluation or work experience from working with civil society organizations at global, regional or national levels. Among the proposed teams, RFN will select the team that provides best value for money based on a consideration of a) to what extent the team is well suited for the task, emphasising in-depth expertise (including academic work) and the relevance of the specific technical expertise and experience of the team member(s), and b) the costs expressed in daily fees.

When assessing the qualifications of the team, RFN will look particular for the following:

- Demonstrated research and evaluation skills including research methodologies including qualitative data collection and analysis
- Experience from reviewing/evaluating activities of similar nature, including REDD+ projects, technical expertise in forestry or other natural resources management
- Good understanding of climate change mitigation and FCPF/REDD+ mechanisms
- Good understanding of monitoring and evaluation, and results management as practiced in ODA-funded NGOs.

#### **Consultant's proposal**

Candidates interested in submitting a proposal should register by August 10<sup>th</sup> 2018 to the following email address: [andershl@rainforest.no](mailto:andershl@rainforest.no).

Candidates will be given the programme description and results framework. Questions regarding the assignment can be submitted and the answers will be shared with all registered candidates.

The candidates must submit the following 4

- CV of all consultants in the team, and a brief summary (maximum two pages combined) of their qualifications. Daily fees based on 8 working hours per day. If team members have different fees, the expected division of labour between them must be indicated.
- Proposed methodology, max 2 pages.
- If the consultant(s) is not located in Oslo, the costs for at least one travel to Oslo. Other travel costs will be agreed separately, based on economy class travel and compensated according to Norwegian government travel regulations.
- Any other costs necessary to carry out the review.

Proposals must be sent to [stiling@rainforest.no](mailto:stiling@rainforest.no) by August 20<sup>th</sup> 2018.



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